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As America moved into the 21" century financial scandals associated with large
publicly traded corporations brougt widespread concern about the reliability of financial
reporting. In response the U.S. Congress adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(SOX). Undergirding SOX was the belief that improvements in the reliability of an
organization's financial disclosures would lead to increased trust in the issuing
organization.
While SOX is aimed at publicly traded private sector organizations, the value of
adopting SOX-like practices in the public and the nonprofit sectors have en recognized.
Although SOX-like auditing practices have not at the time of this research become part of
the auditing regime for municipalities, the results of this research provide a baseline
"read" of municipal finance officers' perceptions of the value and obstacles associated
with adoption of two major components of SOX: Principal Officer(s) Certification (POC)
and the Independent Audit Committee (IAC) requirements.
The author mailed surveys to all finance oficers of municipalities in Florida and
Ohio with populations of 10,000 or greater which did not contract out the operation of
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their finance departments. Post-survey "elite" interviews were conducted in an effort to
obtain a deeper understanding of revealed issues and contradictions found in the analysis
of the results of the mails survey.
The findings suggest municipal finance officers are willing to adopt POC but have
reservations about implementing IAC. With both POC and IAC the respondents
appeared to consider intangible, non-pecuniary consequences as much or more than
tangible, pecuniary consequences. Consistent with prior research, attitudes regarding
POC and IAC were found to be unrelated to prior adoptive behavior, or personal and
organizational demographic variables. Although accounting and auditing are inexorably
intertwined, views of the recently implemented GASB 34 reporting model were found to
be unrelated to the willingness to adopt POC or IAC.
Findings dovetail with current discourse in public sector accounting suggesting
local finance professio als may see benefitsboth tangible d intangible-to some but
not all accounting practices adopted in the private sector. This is consistent with the
commonly accepted lief t public sector accounting maintains fundamental
differences from its private counterpart.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As America moved into the 2 1 " century financial scandals associated with Enon,
Adelphia, Tyco, and WorldCom brought about widespread concern about the reliability
of financial reporting in the publicly-traded private sector (Grumet, 2007, p. 7). To calm
the raging crisis of confidence in American capitalism the U.S. Congress adopted the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("A price worth paying," 2005, p. 83). Undergirding the
SOX legislation was the belief that improvements in the reliability of organization's
financial disclosures will lead to increased trust in the organization. In an effort to
increase the reliability of financial reporting the framers of SOX focused on greater
independence of those involved in the auditing-assurance process and specific assignment
of responsibility for accurate reporting.
Because SOX was implemented to correct problems in the private sector "there is
a great inclination for those in government service, whether local, state, or federal, to
view the problems as relating only to the private sector and as not really impacting or
having implications for the governmental sector" (Brown, 2005, p. 20). In contrast, those
concerned with regulating and guiding public sector and nonprofit financial auditing
practices have taken a different view. Federal agencies have already come under SOX-
like regulations (Duquette, 2005; George, 2005; Hawkins & Hardwick, 2005). Several
state legislatures have either passed or are considering proposals imposing SOX-like
requirements on nonprofit entities' (Mulligan, 2007; Holt, 2006; Vermeer, Raghunandan,
& Forgione, 2006). At the state and local level SOX-like requirements have not yet been
1 California, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, New Hampshire, and West Virginia have passed acts codifying
some SOX-like reforms for nonprofits. New York and Massachusetts have proposed bills (Mulligan,
2007).
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imposed, but the latest version of the Goverment Finance Officers Association's
(GFO A) Recommended Practice for Audit Committees (2006) captures essential
ingredients of the structure and operation of audit committees as required by SOX
(Gauthier, 2007a). Whether SOX-like practices for the nonprofit and government
sectors will be imposed regulations or be expressed as recommendations of "best
practices;" SOX-like principles appear to be coming to the local government sector.
The broad question of this study is whether SOX-like regulations should apply to
municipalities? It is acknowledged that whether SOX-like regulations should apply to
municipalities will influenced by future events, many actors, and initutional-political
forces. Both regulators and those regulated will influence the decision. One of the key
actors which will influence whether SOX-like regulations should apply to the municipal
sector is the municipal finance officer.
The views of the municipal finance officers are important because they are the
administrative officers with the technical expertise who generally would have the
responsibility for interpreting and implementing any new audit requirements (Del
Vecchio, Johnson, & Magner, 2007). Their collective views have the potential to impact
the shaping of SOX-like requi ements for the municipal sector. In short, the municipal
finance officers are at the nexus of the regulation and how it is implemented.
The focus of this study is on the willingness of municipal finance officers to have
their municipalities being required to adopt new SOX-like auditing requirements. The
study considers the municipal finance officers' perception of the consequences and
obstacles related to acceptance of two major components of SOX: Principal Officer
other factors that may influence their views.
Why a Study of Whether Enhanced Audit Requirements Should Come to the Municipal
Sector?
This study is being undertaken at a time when actions taken in the U.S. and
internationally are aimed at improving the relevance and reliability of governmental
financial reporting. Relevance is related basically to what is measured, how it is
measured, and the form of reporting the fiancial information in the organization's
financial statements. Reliability of accounting information can be thought of as the
processes and procedures which provide assurance that what is reported in the financial
statements is accurate and not misleading. Both relevance and reliability are "primary
qualities that make accounting information useful for decision making' (FASB Concept
Statement No. 2, 1980, p. 5).
Accounting information can be used in service to different i o ational needs.
One form is the budget which has been recognized as "the most important financial
document in government" (Cote & Herron, 2000, p. 32). The budget serves the important
role of providing information about how the government intends to spend the taxpayers'
money (Rubin, 2000). Another use of accounting information involves the use of
managerial accounting techniques, such as activity based costing, which can be "tailored
to the individual needs of a jurisdiction [that can] make a local government more efficient
and effective" (McCue, Gianakis, & Frank, 2007, p. 156). A final major use of
accounting information is in the preparation of the audited financial statements. While
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the budget provides a prospective view of the financial activities of the government, the
audited financial statements provides a retrospective view.
Budgeting, management accounting, and audited financial statements all serve the
larger important public administration issues of accountability and trust in government.
Recognizing that both accountability and trust in government are broad concepts which
are multi-faceted and complex, there is a general recognition that enanced accountability
can facilitate eater trus in government (Fard & v Rostay, 2007).
Acknowledging there are many factors which affect accountability and trust, the growing
importance of fancial accounting and auditing for serving governmental accountability
has been recognized both in the U.S. and internationally (Staats, 1996). As Andersen
(1997) from the World Bank stated:
Financial accountability is a broad concept which embraces accounting and
auditing as fundamental elernents of stewardship. Stewardship requires integrity
and an attitude of responsiveness and responsibility, which in turn leads to good
governance... .Without financial accountability, good governance is impaired
(Para. 3).
The enactment of the SOX legislation by the U.S. Congress supports the view that
financial accounting and auditing serve accountability and trust. Although SOX was
aimed at restoring trus in corporate America (Raxaee & Crumbly, 2007), adoption of
SOX-like regulations for increasing trust in government has been recognized (Walker,
2005; Brown, 2005). The possibility of SOX-like enhanced auditing regulations coming
to the municipal sector is what inspired this study.
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President George W. Bush characterized SOX as "the most far reaching reform of
American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt" (cited in "The
Laws," 2005, para. 21). Yuji Ijiri (2005) refers to SOX as "the most important
legislation on securities transactions and accouting issues since the establishment of the
SEC" (p. 256-257). SOX mandates a number of reforms intended to facilitate the
reliability of financial reporting and transfer the risk for "honest reporting" from the
external stakeholders (e.g. citizenry, investors, legislative and oversight bodies, and
creditors) to primarily the organization's management (Ijiri 2005, p. 266).
SOX has not been without its critics. Its implementation has been time-
consu-mng and expensive. ("A price worth paying," 2005; Feldman, 2005; Levisohn,
2005). Many have argued the additional financial reporting assurances called for under
SOX have done little to make the average shareholder or other stakeholder more
comfortable with corporate behavior or more immune to insider manipulation. Some
have even argued that SOX implementation has deterred corporate start-ups, driven
publicly-traded firms off the exchanges, or sent American capital overseas. In short,
these critics see SOX as well-intended but a form of "overkill" that adds additional costs
to the financial reporting process for the corporation with little tangible payoff to
stakeholders (shareholders, managers, and the public).
Notwithstanding these criticisms, SOX's repeal seems remote, but relaxation of
some provisions, especially Section 4Q42, is probable (Barlas, 2007). Meanwhile,
2 Section 404 requires the management and the external auditor to report on the company's internal control
over financial reporting. It is often described as the most costly and controversial provision of the SOX
legislation requiring a great deal of documentation and testing (Levisohn, 2005; Grumet, 2007; Bedard,
Graham, Hoitash, & Hoitash, 2007).
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corporate America has accepted-albeit grudgingly-the additional time, expense, and
effort needed to improve the reliability of their financial disclosures. On a related front,
the Securities and Exchange Commission and others in the Securities arena have
implemented the SOX requirements while performing their own "clean-ups" of the
mutual fund industry, and even the New York Stock Exchange itself. In short, the drive
toward more reliable financial statements and responsible corporate behaviors are a
tandem that will not soon disappear from the financial landscape. The recent large
bankruptcies and bail-outs of financial institutions underscore the continuing need for
more reliable financial information and responsible corporate behavior.
SOX reforms, which are intended to improve "the accuracy and reliability of
corporate disclosures" (SOX, Preamble), can be classified into two general groups. First
are those reforms which deal with the external parties who are involved in the assurance
process and marketing of the securities (Parles, O'Sullivan, & Shannon, 2005, p. 38). For
example, SOX has changed the relationship of corporations with their external auditors,
brought the establishment of auditing standards and oversight of the auditing profession
under Federal control through the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board3
(PCAOB), and affected the standards and rules of stock market exchanges.
The second other general classification includes those provisions which are
directed at the management and directors of the corporation. These are provisions
specifically addressed to issues of individual responsibility, independence of the audit
committee and the design and review of the internal controls. Generally they are
3 It shoulde noted that while the SOX legislation allowed for the SEC to have control over accounting
standards, the PCAOB chose to continue having the accounting profession determine accounting standards.
As stated by Boster (2007), "there does not seem to be in compelling explanation for why the 'A' in
PCAOB stands for 'Accounting' rather than the more descriptive 'Auditing,' given the statuto mission
(p. 131).
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provisions which deal with "who is accountable for what" with implications for what
constitutes good governance.
The two major provisions included in this study are the "Principal Officer(s)
Certification" (POC) and "Independent Audit Committee" (IAC) requirements. In short,
POC requires the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO)
to take "personal responsibility for financial statements" with failure to do so possibly
resulting in cr inal penalties (Williams, 2005, p. 255). The essence of IAC is the
requirement for companies to have an audit committee comprised of independent
directors with at least one member being a "financial expert" (Parles et al, 2007, p. 39).
Principal Officer(s) Certification (POC) and Independent Audit Committee (IA C)
POC and IAC reflect basic tenets of SOX which address the involvement and
participation of top management and directors in the assurance (auditing) process. They
ae intended to enhance the reliability of what is reported in the financial statements.
Perhaps most importantly, from a research perspective, both POC and IAC are not totally
foreign to the municipal accountingauditing process. This should allow the respondents
to the research instrument to more reliably relate to questions regarding these components
(Neuman, 1997, p. 236).
An attenuated form of POC currently exists with municipal financial reporting
when the Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) includes a "letter of
transmittal" and the external auditor has been provided with a "management
representation letter." The letter of transmittal is typically addressed to the citizens of the
community and signed by executive officers of the city. It refers to how the financial
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statements are, to the best of the signing officers' knowledge and belief, accurate. The
management representation letter is addressed to the external auditor, signed by the
executive officers of the city, and basically assures the external auditors that all material
financial information concerning the city has been provided to the auditors. Neither letter
legally assigns personal responsibility to the signing officers and allows for them to ve
"plausible deniability" regarding any uncovered isrepresentations in the financial
statements (e for exm ple the Enron case).
The thrust of POC is in assigning legal and personal accountability to the signing
officers. Ifnothing else, the POC provision makes it clear the top management of an
organization are ultimately responsible for the audited financial statements. Attesters can
no longer simply claim "unawareness" of any misrepresentation. The signg officers are
certifying the financial statements do not contain any untrue statements or omit any
statements of a material fact which would make the report mislea ing. The certifying
officers are assuring the users that the financial statements fairly present in all material
respect the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer The signing
officers, along with other management, e assigned responsibility for the establishment,
maintenance, and effectiveness of the internal controls and that any material weaknesses
are reported to the issuer's external auditors. Failure to comply with these requirements
ca subject the signing officers to crimnal pnalties (SOX, 2002, Sections 302, 404, &
906). The responsibilities assigned to the principal officers are significantly greater than
existing requirements and key components of POC were explained in the survey
instrument (Appendix A).
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Although the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) has
recommended the use of an audit committee since 1997, anecdotal evidence suggests
wide-spread adoption of audit committees by municipalities has not occurred. Even i
wide-spread adoption had occurred, the requirements of IAC significantly change the
structure and operation of audit committees. Nevertheless, as a result of the efforts of
GFOA, the general concept of an audit committee should not be totally foreign to
municipal finance officers.
As explained in the survey instrument (Appendix A), the IAC emphasizes the
independence of the members and assigns them responsibility for selecting, overseeing,
communicating, and employing the external auditors. The IAC is required to have at
least one member who is an "expert" in accounting. The IAC provisions imply the
members of the committee should knowledgeable of financial accounting and auditing
and should understand the operations and operating environment of the organization,
especially financial risks that may threats to the organization (SOX, 2002, Sections
202, 301, & 407; Beasley, Carcello, & Hermanson, 1999).
Could SOX-like Practices be Coming to Municipalities?
SOX-like practices such as POC and IAC are enhanced auditing standards. In the
U.S. the source of auditing standads for municipalities is a complex interrelated netork
of state law4 , federal regulation, and the auditing profession. In addition there are
professional associations, such as the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA),
which can recommend "best practices." From the perspective of nation-wide auditing
In the U.S. federalist system the individual states have authority over the accounting and auditing
procedures and practices of municipalities.
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standards for municipalities there are currently two primary sources. The American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) publishes what is referred to as
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS). For those municipalities receiving
grants from the federal government their audits must also conform to the Generally
Accepted Gover ent Auditing Standards (GAGAS) published by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO). In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has limited authority if fraud is indicated in the financial statements of
municipalities which issue municipal securities5 (SEC 2007). At the time of this study
neither POC nor IAC are auditing standards applicable to the municipal sector.
Nevertheless, there have been signals that indicate POC and IAC may become
requirements for the municipal sector.
The recognition of the importance of SOX-like regulations in the public sector
first occurred at the federal level. The federal agencies came under the influence of
SOX-like requirements through revisions of the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) Circul A-123, Management's Responsibility for Internal Controls. Hawkins
and Hardwick (2005) described the revisions to Circular A-123 as mirroring "the spirit of
SOX" (p. 57). These revisions, which became effective in 2006, require federal agencies
to follow the Treadway Commission's Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) 6
guidance on internal control called Internal Control-Integated Framework (which also
serves as the grounding for the independent audit committee and internal control
Municipal securities is a te which refers to bonds, notes, and other debt instruments issued by states,
local governments, or their agencies and instrumentalities (Cox, 2007).
6 OS is an independent private sector committee formed in 1985 and sponsored by the American
Accounting Association (AAA), The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA),
Financial Executive International (FEI), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), and the Institute of
Management Accountants (IMA).
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requirements of SOX). These COSO provisions were also referenced in the so-called
"Yellow Book," published by the GAO, which governs internal control and auditor
standards applied to federal and local entities under its regulatory do in (Marcia
Buchanan, personal communication, January 12, 2006). The revisions to OMB Circular
A-123 and recommendations of the "Yellow Book" require federal agencies to follow
requirements which are similar to SOX, but modified to accommodate the different
environment of the federal gove nent sector. David Walker, former Comptroller
General and head of the GAO stated, "the GAO continues to monitor the implementation
of the major accountability provisions in SOX and, when appropriate, to promote their
application in government" (Walker, 2005, p. 270).
In the nonprofit sector there is a movement to incorporate certain aspects of SOX
as best practices (Smith & Richmond, 2007; Holt, 2006). SOX-like reforms have been
proposed in New York and Massachusetts and have been enacted in California,
Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, and New Hampshire (Mulligan, 2007). Generally these
statutes have focused on POC d IAC (Mulligan, 2007).
At the state and local level SOX is not yet a requirement. However, there is some
evidence that SOX-like regulations may be on the horizon. The 2006 version of the
Government Finance Officers Association's (GFOA) Recommended Practice for Audit
Committees reflects some of the basic ingredients reg ading the structure and operation of
audit corittees similar to the IAC requirement (Gauthier, 2007a). In addition, during
2007 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requested changes to the current
regulatory environment of municipal securities (Ga ey, 2007). While the white paper
sent to Congress by the SEC did not specifically suggest tht SOX should required for
11
municipalities which issue municipal bonds, the SEC did speak to its need to have
additional authority "To provide investors in municipal securities with access to full,
accurate, and timely info ation like that enjoyed by investors in many other U.S. capital
markets" (SEC, 2007, p. 4).
These "signals" illustrate the recognition by regulators and professional
associations of the value of POC and IAC to the public and nonprofit sectors.
Nonetheless, to bring SOX-like POC and IAC as regulations to the municipal sector
important issues need to be resolved; perhaps the most important being the issue of who
would author and enforce the regulations. Another question is what changes in state law,
such as "Sunshine" provisions, are necessary. These are issues beyond the scope of this
study.
The focus of this study is on the willingness of municipal finance officers to have
their municipalities be required to adopt new auditing requirements similar to POC and
IAC. Because auditing and accounting are so inexorably intertwined, exploring the
municipal finance officers' views of the recently implemented Governmental Accounting
Standards Board7 (GASB) 34 reporting model are considered because they may influence
the finance officers' intentions to adopt or oppose POC ad AC,. The back ound of the
development of the GASB 34 reporting model is important to this study because it
provides insight into why financial reporting has become a more impo t topic in public
administration financial management.
7 The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) is not a governmental entity. The GASB is a
component of the professional accounting structure. The GASB publishes standards, referred to as
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) for state and local governments. Although the states
have the authority to set accounting principles, most states have recognized the GASB as the official source
for GAAP.
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Convergence Model and New Public Management
The po ation of SOX-like practices into the governmental sector can be
viewed as p of a broader mosaic of im sing business-like accounting practices onto
the public sector which has been occurring in the U.S. and elsewhere. The importation of
business-like accounting practices and reporting into the gove ent sectors, herein
referred to as a Convergence Model (CM), has received substantial coverage in the
literature (Christiaens & Rommel, 2008). The CM plays a central role in the New Public
Management (NPM) and has led to what some view as a new era of fmancial
management under the rubric of the New Public Financial Management (NPFM) (Vinnari
and Nasi, 2008).
From a global perspective the conceptual support and involvement of the NPM
movement has been important and substantial. Under the broad umbrella of the NPM
movement there has been recognition of how accounting can beutilied a n
"instrument of change" for re-inventing government and impacting management
practices (Lapsley & Pallot, 2000). As Peter Smith (1996) stated "Much of the impetus
behind the new public sector management arises from a conviction that the methods of
accounting applied to the corporate sector can t sfered to the public sector" ( ).
Coincident with the goals of the NPM many countries have embraced adopting private-
sector accounting techniques in the public sector. As June Pallot (1999) noted,
"Accounting has been a key element in supporting the removal of public/private sector
distinctions and the imposition of explicit and measurable stadards of performance" (p.
419).
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Although the impact of the NPM movement is more evident in the accounting
practices outside the U.S ., the NPM movement and its counterpart the "reinventing
government" (REGO) movement, illustrate public administration perspectives that
endorse a greater role for private-sector accounting practices in the public sector. In the
U.S. an "official" adoption of business-like accounting practices by the local public
sector has been a result of actions taken by the Governmental Accounting Standards
Board (GASB).
Formation and Rise of the GASB
Unlike the private sector where Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) for accounting have existed on a nation-wide basis for some time, up until the
1980s "all 50 states had different accounting procedures" (Icerman & Simson, 1996, p.
75). During the 1970s the financial crisis of several major cities, especially the New
York default, brought the problems of a lack of national standards for municipal reporting
and enforcement to the forefront. Several bodies, including the National Committee on
Governmental Accou ting (NCGA), the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB),
and U.S. Senate became involved in the debate about who should have control over the
reporting standards and enforcement of state and local governmental accounting (Burton,
1980, p. 13-14). There were perceived weaknesses with each of the candidates; finally in
1984 a compromise was reached with the establishment of the Governmental Accounting
Standards Board (GASB).
' For example, in New Zealand and Australia there has been almost a wholesale importation of business-
like accounting measurements into the governmental sector (Karan, 2003; Carnegie & West, 2005).
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The GASB was empowered to establish accounting standards for state and local
governments and enforce them when a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) audited the
financial statements. Although individual states continued to have ultimate authority
over the standards of financial accounting and reporting for municipalities located within
their jurisdiction, most of the states chose to require municipalities to follow the GAAP
determined by the GASB. In addition, many cities elected to have their annual financial
report audited by CPAs. For the first time in American history the GASB provided a
single authority for determining the proper accounting and reporting for municipalities on
a national basis9 .
In the formative years the actions of GASB did not make substantial changes to
basic municipal accounting procedures and practices. The first signs of a significant
change in municipal accounting occurred when the GASB completed its work on a new
reporting model that had been on its agenda from the inception (Foltin, 2008). The new
reporting model was introduced in 1999 with the issuance of GASB Statement 34, Basic
Financial Statements- and Management's Discussion and Analysis-for State and Local
Governments (GASB 34). Depending upon the size of the municipality, implementation
occurred in the fiscal years ending in 2002 through 2004.
Significance of GASB 34
Similar to the recognition of SOX as "the most important legislation on securities
transactions and accounting issues since the establishment of the SEC" (jiri, 2005);
9 It should be noted that while most of the states have required municipalities to adopt the GAAP as
determined by GASB there remain some states which have not required GASB compliance (e.g. New
Jersey) and recently some states have rejected more recent pronouncements related to retirement benefits
other than pensions (e.g. Texas).
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GASB 34 has been described as "the most significant change in the history of
governmental accounting" (Allen, 1999). The statement requires the "flow of economic
resources measurement focus" and "accrual basis of accounting" for the newly required
government-wide financial statements. In short, these new business-like reporting and
measurements make the financial information provided by municipalities more like
private sector financial accounting and reporting. The most controversial aspect ofthe
new requi ements was the recognition of long-term assets and long-term liabilities in the
new entity-wide "balance sheet-like" Statement ofNet Assets and the recognition of
depreciation expense on the capital assets (including infrastructure) in the new entity-
wide "income statement-like" Statement ofActivities (Foltin, 2008).
While GASB 34 did require adoption of business-like practices such as accrual
accounting and entity-wide reporting (which are consistent with practices in other
nations), it also retained a set of the traditional reports and accounting. The practical
impact of this dual approach is that it allows municipalities to continue to use traditional
fund accountingo in their daily operations. At the same time users of the annual financial
statements have reports related to both "fiscal accountability" and "operational
accountability" (GASB 34).
Fiscal accountability serves the important traditional role ofgovernmental
accounting by providing information about the government's current period legal
compliance in "raising and spending of public moneys" (GASB 34, 1999, para. 203).
Operational accountability has the goal of providing information in the financial
statements which assist users in assessing the municipality's "operating results; cost of
10 Traditional fund accounting includes recognition of the legislative adopted budget, encumbrances, and
expenditures.
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services; economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; and interperiod equity" (GASB 34,
1999, para. 234). The accounting profession recognizes that operational accountability is
complex and very difficult to measure in the public sector". In releasing GASB 34 the
GASB acknowledged the required government-wide financial statements would
contribute to operational accountability, but that additional information and standards
would be needed (GASB 34, 1999, para. 234).
As currently constituted the GASB 34 reporting model is complex and difficult to
read (Chase & Phillips, 2004, p. 27) and as the accounting profession has stated:
"Information cannot be useful to decision makers who cannot understand it" (FASB
Concept Statement 2, 1980, p. 5). Neither has the model resolved the difficult issues
surrounding the measurement of program effectiveness and perfo nce reporting. In
spite of these shortcomings and some controversy, the GASB 34 reporting "appears to be
firmly embedded in contemporary public financial management" and "knowledge of the
standard is sine qua non for new graduates of public administration programs" (Frank,
Gianakis, & McCue, 2005, p. 558-559).
The significance of the GASB 34 reporting model to this study is whether the
municipal finance officers experiences with implementing the GASB 34 reporting model
influences their intentions to adopt or oppose POC and IAC. Although POC and IAC are
auditing standards which are different from accounting principles, accounting and
auditing are so inexorably intertwined it is possible the experiences with implementing
the GASB 34 reporting model may influence the municipal finance officers' intentions to
adopt or oppose POC and IAC. As a result, consideration of the municipal finance
" See for example the American Accounting Association's 1972 release of the Report of the Committee on
Concepts of Accounting Applicable to the Public Sector., 1970-71.
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officers' assessment of the value and appropriateness of the GASB 34 reporting model is
included in the survey instrument (Appendix A).
Controversial Issues
This study is conducted at a time when there are some important issues
surrounding U.S. municipal fmancial accounting and auditing. Although most of the
states have required compliance with the GASB GAAP, it is still a voluntary act by each
state. The basic tenet of federalism gives the power to ech te to set accounting and
auditing standards for themselves d their municipalities. Recent actions have raised
questions about whether individual states will continue requiring municipalities to
comply with GASB GAAP 1 2 . Another stream of discord has come from the much
respected GFOA. The GFOA has stated it is reassessing its support for GASB and
perhaps opting for the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to become the
authoritative accounting body for state and local governments (GFOA, 2007).
Partially in response to the dissension from GASB GAAP, the SEC has indicated
an interest in having legislation which would allow the SEC to designate the GASB as
the official body for designating GAAP for municipalities (SEC, 2007). In the same
document the SEC expressed concern that "issuers of municipal securities may lack
policies and procedures adequate to ensure accurate and full disclosure in their offering
documents and are not legally required to certify the accuracy of their disclosures" (SEC,
12 Municipalities in New Jersey must use statutory accounting methods other than GASB GAAP. Texas
has allowed their municipalities to opt-out of complying with GASB 45. Connecticut passed a bill that
would have allowed the state to set accounting standards different than GASB, but the bill was vetoed by
the Governor.
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2007, p. 9). While SOX was not specifically mentioned by the SEC, there was clearly the
implication of an interest in imposing SOX-like requirements, especially POC.
If the SEC does receive authority to regulate municipal accounting and auditing,
this would be a significant change from the existing municipal financial reporting regime.
From a public policy perspective this would represent a shift in power from the states to
the federal government. Using the current implementation of SOX in the private sector
as a guide, the authority for establishing accounting would remain with the accounting
profession (GASB) but auditing standards would come under the direct control of the
SEC. The impact for municipal finance directors would be similar to the private sector.
Those municipalities which issue bo s through regulated markets would have to
conform to an expanded set of auditing standards beyond those municipalities which do
not issue such bonds.
Could it happen? The sho answer is yes. The total size of the municipal
securities market" is enormous, hovering around $2.5 trillion. The municipal securities
routinely provide financing for the public goods such as roads, parks, schools, and other
government provided astructure. As Chistopher Cox, Chairman of the SEC
commented: "Investors, analysts, investment advisers, and broker-dealers deserve the
same level of current, high-quality disclosure and protection in the municipal market as
they do in the corporate market" (Cox, 2007). In the same speech, Chairman Cox spoke
to how both citizens and taxpayers pay the price "when municipal finance isn't conducted
properly."
1 Municipal securities are those bonds, notes, and other debt instruments that are issued by states,
municipalities, and other local governmental entities (Cox, 2007).
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Signficance of Study
The topic of enhanced auditing standards for the public sector raises important
policy issues for public administration and public finance, e.g., federal authority versus
states rights, the imposition of private-sector practices onto the public sector, and the role
of audited financial reports in serving accountability and trust in government. It is
acknowledged that whether SOX-like enhanced auditing standards will be applied to
municipalities will be influenced by future events, many actors, and institutional-political
forces. The broad question of this study is whether SOX-like enhanced auditing
standards should apply to municipalities. Regulators and professional associations ve
indicated their interest in having both POC and IAC apply to the public sector. The
research question of this study is the willingness of municipal finance officers to have
their municipality being required to adopt SOX-like POC and IAC.
SOX-like POC and IAC regulations enjoin the leadership and nagement ofthe
municipality to participate in the assurance (auditing) processes and practices which
surround wht is reported in the audited financial statements. POC assigns legal and
personal responsibility to the signing officers for the accuracy and completeness of the
information contained in the audited financial statements. The IAC provides additional
oversight of the municipality's auditing processes and practices by an "independent"
body.
Research exploring the factors which influence municipal finance officers'
willingness to have their municipalities required to adopt new audit requirements is
largely unexplored. To fill the gap in this largely unexplored area, this study offers a
baseline "read" of municipal finance officers' willingness to embrace POC and IAC and
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identify possible drivers of support or opposition to such requirements. The study
considers the municipal finance officer' perception of the consequences and obstacles
related to acceptance of POC and IAC, as well as the possible modifying affect of their
views toward the GASB 34 reporting model. Intervening events, such as gaining more
information about the details of the requirements or how important others view the
requirements, may alter the municipal financial officers' views obtained from this study.
Nonetheless, this examination of the willingness of financial officers to embrace required
POC and IAC and their perception of associated benefits and obstacles will provide
preliminary inforation useful to further studies by public administration researchers,
practitioners and others involved in the process.
The research objectives of this study include:
1. Determining the willingness of municipal finance officers to accept required adoption
of POC and IAC.
2. Identifying the determinants of the revealed intentions and test the relationship that
exists between the determinants and the intention.
3. Uncovering any potential benefits and obstacles associated with required POC and
IAC perceived by the municipal finance officers.
4. Exploring the municipal finance officers' views of the GASB 34 reporting model and
whether these views influence their intentions to adopt or oppose POC and IAC.
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CHAPTER 11
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
HYPOTHESES AND QUESTIONS
This study is an exploratory effort to discern how municipal finance officers view
the imposition of two SOX-like (audit) regulations onto the municipal sector: "principal
officer(s) ce ification" (POC) and an "independent audit committee" (IAC). To the
author's knowledge this study is the first to examine the pre-regulation views of
municipal finance officers as well as factors that may be influencing their views toward
the potential imposition of POC and IAC regulations upon municipalities. In
endeavoring to identify the possible drivers of municipal finance officers' support for or
opposition to these potentially "new" audit requirements in the municipal sector, the
research objectives include: 1) uncovering perceived potential benefits and obstacles
associated with required POC and IAC, and 2) exploring how the municipal finance
officers' views the new reporting requirements of GASB 34 and whether these views
might influence their intention to support or oppose POC and IAC regulation.
Reseaching the factors whch uence a municipal finance officer's support for
or opposition to having a "new" auditing requirement imposed upon their municipality is
largely unexplored. This is not to say that pre-regulation views of those who would be
subject to a new audit regulation are ignored. When a new audit requirement is under
consideration by a regulator 4 , an exposure draft is sent to potential regulatees and other
interested parties soliciting their views on the audit requirements. Those views are then
14 Regulators of audit requirements on a national basis include the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, (AICPA), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Of course, individual States can also add additional audit
requirements to municipalities within their jurisdiction.
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considered by the regulator in revising the exposure draft and releasing a final audit
requirement. This "due process15" is basically a process of determining audit
requirements from a consensus of "expert" opinions. The importance of expert
consensus to the formation of audit regulations is not denied. However, the due process
does not provide information about what factors influenced the municipal finance
officers' views toward new audit requirements.
Although public sector financial audit regulations are highly technical, from the
broader perspective taken in this study they represent administrative processes (Gianakis
& McCue, 1997). Research exploring the factors which influence municipal finance
officers' willingness to have their municipalities required to adopt new audit
requirements should be of interest to scholars and practitioners in public administration,
public finance, accounting, and auditing. To fill the gap in this largely unexplored area,
this study is offered as an initial indication of municipal finance officers' perception of
the consequences and obstacles related to having their municipality embrace heightened
audit committee requirements and specific assignment of personal responsibility for the
integrity of the published financial statements. To the author's knowledge, there is no
"Unified Theory of Audit Innovation Adoption in the Public Sector" to build upon.
Nonetheless, there are several strains of thought that inform this study.
Findings from Accounting Innovation Adoption
Because accounting and auditing are inexorably intertwined the author reviewed
recent studies of accounting innovation acceptance in the public sector. Jackson and
" See for example the discussion of the "due process" in Government Accountability Office's (GAO)
exposure draft on proposed revisions to the Generally Accepted Goverent Auditing Standards (GAGAS)
for 2006.
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Lapsley (2003) found "the most important reason for acco ting innovation in public
sector organizations is statute, regulation, or other external pressure... .it overwhelms all
other reasons" ( 366-367). Several scholars have recognized the importance of
legislative action, statute, funding sources, and professional interests as external
influences on accounting innovation adoption by local governments (Geiger & Ittner,
1996; Brignall & Modell, 2000; Cavalluzzo & Ittner, 2004). That an innovation will be
adopted if required by an external body that has authority is certainly not surprising.
However, as observed by Mohr (1969) the adoption of an innovation does not necessarily
signify the acceptance of an innovation. An organization or individual may adopt an
innovation then discontinue it for some reason or maintain it only on a token level (Mohr,
1969, p. 113). In the present study the focus is on the dimension of acceptance of POC
and IAC, not on whether POC and IAC will be implemented or adopted if required.
Re e chers have found the acceptance of a new accounting innovation to be
related to the organizational factors of political leadership, senior management
acceptance, organizational culture and norms (Lapsley & Pallot, 2000; Chia & Ko
2007; Cavalluzzo & Ittner, 2004; Kloot & Martin, 2007). These findings are supported
by similar findings regarding innovation acceptance by public sector entities for
innovations other than accounting and will be considered in the present study (Vigoda-
Gadot, Shoham, Schwabsky, 2005; Bernier & Hafsi, 2007; Moon, 1999; Durst & Newell,
1999; Watson, 1997; Kamal, 1996).
Endorsements by leaders and managers, as well as compatibility with existing
organizational norms, have been recognized within the broader findings of diffusion
innovation (Rogers, 2003). Diffusion of innovation is one of the most studied of all social
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science topics, although some researchers have argued that innovation research has not
emerged as a major theme in public administration (Vigoda-Gadot, Shoham, Schwabsky,
& Ruvio, 2005; see also Rogers, 2003, p. 45). While it y true that changes in the
way things are done in the public sector have not been studied extensively under the
rubric of innovation, the extensive literature on public sector reforms suggests public
administration has long had an interest in inovation. To assist in the development of a
conceptual framework for this study, components of the general theory of innovation
diffusion are considered.
Diffusion of Innovations
Many scholars from disparate disciplines have studied innovation diffusion.
Rogers' (2003) reported that when he wrote his first edition of Diffusion ofJnnovation
published in 1962 there existed 405 publications about the topic, by the time he published
his fifth edition in 2003 he estimated that publications had grown to 5200 (p. xviii).
Perhaps as a result of the diversity of disciplines which have studied innovation with
differing goals, different concepts and measures, and diverse methodologies; the findings
have often been non-comparable or inconsistent and tend to not be cumulative (Kimberly
& Evansko, 1981, p. 689; Bingham, 1978, p. 179). To at least partially mitigate the
diverse findings, scholars have noted distinctions among innovation research.
Early research of innovations often grappled with the distinction between
invention and innovation. Mohr (1969) distinguished them as follows: "Invention
implies bringing something new into being; innovation plies bring something new into
use" (p. 63). Contemporary research has come to define an innovation as "an idea,
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practice, or object perceived as new by an individual or other ut of adoption" (Rogers,
2003, p. 36). As Daft (1978) explained an innovation "can be old to other organizations
so long as the idea h not been previously been used by the adopting org ztion" (p.
197). Required POC and IAC fit the definition of innovations because they are new
"administrative innovations" to the municipal sector even though they e existing
requirements in the private sector.
The scope of innovation research is wide. It includes the decision to begin
research on a recognized or potential problem, to development of an inovation,
commercializatio difsio to the decision to adopt and plement (Danpour &
Wisc evsky, 2006; Rogers, 2003). Researchers have recognized the difference in the
factors which uence the generation of an innovation and the adoption of an innovation
(Damanpour & Wischnevsky, 2006, p. 271). In the present study the focus is innovation
adoption or more specifically on innovation acceptance. As Mohr (1969) has discussed
innovation adoption and innovation acceptance may not be synonymous (p. 113).
Because the adoption of POC and IAC on a sector-wide basis will most likely occur after
they have become a requirement, Malmi (1999) has suggested that motives for an
organization facing a "forced selection" will play no role in the adoption or rejection of
an innovation (p. 653). The perspective of this research is that understanding the
organizational motives, obstacles, and availability of resources for overcoming the
obstacles prior to being required to adopt an innovation may facilitate what Mohr (1969)
refers to as a "successful" adoption of an innovation.
It has been suggested that distinguishing different types of innovations is
necessary for understanding and identifying the factors which influence the decision to
26
accept an innovation (Downs & Mohr, 1976; Damanpour, 1991). Classifications have
included "product" innovations versus "process" innovations (Walker, 2006), "technical"
versus "administrative" (Da npour, 1991), "radical" versus "incremental" (Damanpour
& Wisc evsky, 2006), "amenity" versus "need" (Bingham, 1976), etc. Recent research
has revealed problems with developing contingency theories of innovation based upon
innovation type. For example, Walker (2006) has suggested the distinction between
product and process innovations may be inappropriate because they are more
"conceptually and operationally alike" than research had assumed (p. 313). Damanpour
and Wischnevsky (2006) commented on how "the aggregated results of past empirical
studies do not support the theories of organizational innovation based on differences
between innovation type" (p. 270). While the importance of distinguishing innovation
research by innovation type is arguable, it is acknowledged the findings of his study may
be limited in generality to ad istrative type innovations. Classifing POC ad AC as
administrative innovations reflects their close relationship with management processes
and procedures (Kimberly & Evansko, 1981).
Another distinction which is made in the literature is that between the public
sector and the private sector. True competition, which is viewed as a fundamental root
cause for motivating innovation in the business sector, is non-existent or at best simulated
through "quasi-markets" in the governmental sector. Nonetheless, efficiency and
effectiveness have generally been cited as the goal for adopting innovations in both
sectors (Damanpour, 1991, p. 556). The public sector adoption of private sector
management accounting techniques, e.g., Balanced Scorecard, Activity Based Costing,
are representative of innovation adoption studies concerned with increasing efficiency
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and effectiveness (McCue, Gianakis, & Frank, 2007). However, POC and AC are
administrative innovations that have the goal of increasing trust in the financial
statements. Unlie innovations which are intended to increase efficiency and
effectiveness, POC and IAC would seem to fit within the notion of "legitimacy-seeking"
and may be subject to influence by different factors than efficiency and effectiveness
(Brignall & Modell, 2000)
In sum, the fin gs of this research are limited to public sector innovation
acceptance of administrative innovations which are intended to increase trust in the
published financial atements. This classification of the s dy limits the generalizability
of the dings. On the other hand, the concentration on this "type" of iovation can
assi th eloratory research by helping to identify and isolate factors that can be tested
in confirmatory studies (Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981, p. 691). In addition, there have
been some generalizations, or broad consistencies, which emerge from innovation
research.
One basic concept which has received general support over the t fo decades
of innovation research is that individuals and organizations will innovate when the
benefits outweigh the costs (Mansfield, 1961; Rogers, 2003, p. 233). The bnefits ad
costs may be of an economic nature or they may be related to intangible factors. The
implication is the decision to accept or decline an iovation is directed by some form of
a rational action (Rogers, 2003, p. 232; Mahni, 1999).
Another general guideline is that the influence of organizational and personal
characteristics may be idiosyncratic variables that have different impacts in different
contexts (Gianankis & McCue, 1997). As moderating variables they may foud to
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have a direct relationship, interactive relationship, or no discernable relationship to the
innovation acceptance decision (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003). In the present
study the interest is to determine whether these variables have a significant direct
relationship to the acceptance decision of the municipal finance officers in Florida and
Ohio.
One broad finding which has been acknowledged in innovation research is that
perceived characteristics of the innovation have en found to be most predictive of the
innovation acceptance (To & Ngai, 2007; Rogers, 2003). Several models utilizing the
perceived characteristics of the innovation have been offered in the literature: attributes
of innovation (Rogers, 2003), the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1988) and its
predecessor the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), and the technology
acceptance model (Davis, 1989) which was built upon the theory of reasoned action
model. The multiple models of innovation acceptance (IA) reflect the research interest of
their author, but they all basically focus on how consequences, resources, and obstacles
perceived to be related to a specific innovation are major determinants of user
acceptance. To inform this study the Theory of P1aed Behavior (TPB) wa selected
because it has been found to be a tightly specified model which has been found useful in
multiple contexts, including accounting research (Sutton, 1998; Conner & Armitage,
1998; Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989).
Theory of Planned Behavior(TPB)
TPB and its antecedent theory of reasoned action (TRA) were developed in the
social-psychology literature by Ieek Ajzen and Martin Fish in. In brief, TRA considers
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"attitude" and "subjective norms" as the constructs for determining the construct
"behavioral intention" (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). The TPB
extends the number of dete nates of the TRA by adding "perceived behavioral control"
(Ajzen, 1985, 1988, 1991).
Attitude reflects the individual's personal evaluation of the favorable and
unfavorable consequences associated with the target behavior (e.g., having additional
police on the streets will enhance the "safety image" of the community). Subjective
nor ae the individual's perception of the expectations of important others to perform
or not perform the target behavior (e.g., my city council would support the decision to
voluntarily provide greater disclosure of the city's pension obligations). Perceived
behavioral control refers to the individual's perception of his ability to perform the target
behavior. Perceived ability to perform includes non-motivational factors such as time,
money, skills, and cooperation of others (Ajzen, 1991, p. 182). An example of a control
belief would be - it would be difficult to find a part of my community which would agree
to the development of a landfill.
As Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) sated the general proposition of TPB is consistent
with "common sense" (p. 6). If an individual perceives the consequences of an act are on
the whole favorable (behavioral beliefs); that others important to him would support the
decision (normative beliefs); and if there sufficient resources available and minimal
obstacles (control beliefs); the individual is likely to have a favorable intention to
perform the act (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen, 1988). The theory postulates that absent any
intervening events, favorable intention together with accommodating perceived
behavioral control would then be highly predictive of performing the act.
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TPB is tightly specified by postulating that in most contexts there are only three
determinants of an individual's intentions16 : attitude, subjective norms, and perceived
behavioral control. The relative importance of the three determinates have been found to
vary across situations (Ajzen, 1991, p. 188). For example, at the time the research
instrument of this study was administered, the SOX-like POC and IAC requirements for
municipalities had received little attention. Persons whom the municipal finance officer
might consider as "important others" were unlikely to have formed or communicated
their opinions to the municipal finance officers. As a result, the expectations of important
others (normative beliefs) were not included in the study.
The model further specifies the measures of behavior, intention, and underlying
beliefs must "correspond" or be "compatible" (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Ajzen, 1988).
The essence of correspondence is that the level of specificity of the beliefs measured
should correspond to the level of specificity of the intention measured. The "principle of
compatibility" also postulates that general beliefs (in this study the views toward GASB
34) would not be influential to the support for or opposition to POC and IAC
requirements (Ajzen, 1988, pp. 92-111).
example of following the principle of compatibility in an accounting context
which utilized TPB is Weidman's (2002) dissertation. Her dependent variable was the
respondents' "general attitude tow ds disclosure of environmental liabilities." She then
asked the respondents to rate the following consequences on a 7-point Likert scale
ranging from very undesirable to very desirable.
16 Ajzen (1991) does suggest that with respect to behaviors which include a dimension of ethical or moral
behavior a measure of perceived moral obligation could add predictive power to the TPB model.
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Illustration 2-1
Consequences measured in a
TPB based accounting study
Consequence
Cretna resev for futur util iin
Adesl afectin shr p;rices andor borroin cots
Having comany viewed as acting responsibility in managing environmental
issues.
Having questions raised a bout the accuracy of estimates in the fiancial
st ements.
Fulfilling the obligation to ully inform users of financial statements.
ncreaing the risk of lawsuits.
Adversely affecting profits in the cu ent period.
Show a conservative approach to cial reporting.
Increasing regulatory oversight of the company.
Drawing management attention to environmental issues.
In summary, the TPB is a widely applied general model of the attitudes-behavior
relationships for an individual "which has met with some degree of success in predicting
a variety of behaviors" (Co er & A tage, 1998, p. 1429; see also Elliot, Armitage, &
Baughan, 2003, p. 964). That TPB has been found to explain intentions better than
behaviors fits well with the objectives of this study (Sutton, 1998, p. 1317). In this study
the interest is to determine the acceptability (intentions) to municipal finance officers of
having their municipality subject to required POC and IAC, not their actual adoption by
the municipality (behavior).
TPB will be used in this study to examine the perceived attributes of required
POC and IAC; however it does have some limitations. Several of the independent
variables of interest to this study (prior innovation adoption rates, organizational
variables, and personal variables) are treated as exernal or peripheral variables, rather
than an integr al part of TPB theory (Ajzen & Fishbei 1980, p. 9; Davis, Bagozzi, &
Warshaw, 1989, p. 984). From Ajzen and Fishbein 's (1980) point of view, external
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variables may have a direct influence on the beliefs a person holds bu only indirect
influence on intentions (p. 83). These external v rables which are basically ignored by
the TPB model will be included in the study using guidance provided by the general
innovation acceptance model and prior studies of innovation acceptance in the
governmental sector previously discussed.
TPB is a general model and does not specify the consequences, obstacles, or
resources that are operative for municipal finance officers when assessing the
acceptability of POC or IAC (Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989). To identify these
items for the present study, ideas were obtained from previous studies in accounting, the
reported responses to SOX in the private-sector, and Rogers (2003) attributes of
innovation model. The items were then reviewed by practitioners, regulators, and
academics prior to administering the survey instrument.
Hypotheses and Questions
The most basic proposition of TPB is that beliefs about perceived attributes which
the decision-maker associates with POC and IAC ae evaluated by the decision-maker in
forming a favorable or unfavorable intention to accept POC and IAC (Ajzen, 1991).
Attributes include the consequences the municipal finance officer associates with POC
and IAC, as well as his perception of the resources available and obstacles impeding the
municipality's ability to perfor the act (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1988; Ajzen 1991). In this
study the perceived attributes were categorized in four groupings:
1. Potential favorable outcomes associated with the adoption of POC.
2. Reservations or concerns associated with the adoption of POC.
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3. Potential favorable outcomes associated with the adoption of JAC.
4. Reservations or concerns associated with the adoption of IAC.
According to TPB theory the overall assessment by the municipal finance officers
of the perceived attributes will act as determinates of their intention to accept or oppose
POC and IAC regulations for his community. This relationship results in the following
hypotheses:
H1: The intention to favor or oppose adoption of POC requirements results from
the municipal fiance officer's evaluation of the associated perceived
attributes of adopting required POC.
112: The intention to favor or oppose adoption of IAC requirements results from
the municipal finance officer's evaluation of the associated perceived
attributes of adopting required IAC.
One of the research objectives of this study is to explore the municipal finance
officers' views of the reporting requirements of GASB 34. The municipal finance
officers' views toward GASB 34 are considered as general beliefs about externally
imposed accounting requirements. Based upon the TPB "principle of compatibility"
these general beliefs about GASB 34 should not be influential to the formation of
municipal finance officers' intentions toward POC or IAC (Ajzen, 1988, p. 39). This
results in two additional hypotheses:
H3: General beliefs about GASB 34 will not be influential to the formation of
municipal finance officers' intention to accept or oppose required POC,
14: General beliefs about GASB 34 will not influential to the formation of
municipal finance officers' intention to accept or oppose required IAC.
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That past behavior influences future behavior is a well accepted maxim in
psychology (Ouellette & Wood, 1998, p. 54; Ajzen, 1991, p. 202). Several researchers
have suggested that past havior be added a subst ntive construct to the TPB model
(Ajze 1991, p. 202-203; Ajzen, 2002, p. 45-46; Elliot, Armitage, & Baughan, 2003, p.
965). Ajzen has in general been opposed to the inclusion of past behavior as an
additional cons ct in the TPB model, although he does concede that measurement of
past behavior can, in certain situations, be helpful (Ajzen, 2002, p. 120).
In this study past behavior is measured as the municipality's prior adoptive
behavior (early to late) with regard to accounting statements GASB 34 and GASB 44. It
is acknowledged the rate of adoption of accounting statements, which often require
significant changes in the accounting computing software, may not be the same as
willingness to support or oppose POC and IAC. Nonetheless, it was thought to be
worthwhile to question whether there was any relationship between prior adoptive
behavior of GASB 34 d GASB 44 and support for or opposition to POC and IAC.
The remaining independent variables considered in the current study were
personal demographics of the municipal finance officers and the organizational
demographics of the municipalities. Innovation research has had mixed results regarding
their importance to the acceptance decision and TPB research has either not discussed
them or reported little or no significance. In the present study the effort is to explore
whether there is any significant relationship between any of the personal demographics or
organization variables and the municipal finance officers' support for or opposition to
POC or IAC.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This study deployed multiple steps in collecting and alyzing the data. Data
from the U.S. Census Bureau was used to identify municipalities, their state of location,
and population. A mail survey was used to collect quantifiable data of interest. The data
was analyzed using descriptive statistics, exploratory factor analysis, multiple regression
and logistic regression. A post-survey elite electronic interview was utilized to obtain a
deeper understanding of revealed issues and contradictions fou d in the analysis ofthe
results of the mail survey.
Mail Survey
The mail survey methodology has often been used to learn about individual
attitudes and beliefs, demographics, and behavior (Creswell, 2002; Neuman, 2006). Mail
surveys are recognized as a methodology for obtaining a large amount of data from a
large group that is geogaphically dispersed at a relatively low cost. The methodology
can provide respondent anonymity and allows respondents time to answer the questions.
The methodology allows for consistently structured questions for which responses can be
easily quantified.
Target Population
The target population was the universe of finance officers of municipalities with
populations of 10,000 or greater in the States of Florida d Ohio. These two states were
selected based upon both similarities and differences. The two major similarities are: 1)
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both states require municipalities to prepare audited financial statements in conformity
with the GASB 34 reporting model, and 2) both states contain a comparable number of
municipalities with populations of 10,000 or greater. The differences are several and
may facilitate a greater generalizability to the study. Ohio is one of the "rust belt" states
and Florida is one of the "sun belt" states 7 . These contrasting regional socio-economic
conditions have caused municipalities to face differing problems. While both Ohio and
Florida require their municipalities to produce audited financial statements, however in
Ohio the financial audits are overwhelmingly performed by state employed auditors 8
rather than private sector Certified Public Accountants (CPA). Ohio has municipal chief
financial officers which are elected (especially in the northeast section) and Florida does
not. Ohio requires their municipalities to provide their financial statements for
publication on a state sponsored website and Florida does not. In additio in an effort to
increase response rates, Florida was included as the domicile of Florida International
University d Ohio was included because it is the "home state" of the author of this
study where he served in an elected capacity.
Survey Recipients - Constructing the Mailing List
Identification of the targeted municipalities was provided by the U.S. Census
Bureau in electronically digitized format. The capabilities of Microsoft Access@
relational database permitted capturing the data from the U.S. Census Bureau in unaltered
17 "Rust belt" and "sun belt" are terms used to classify regions of the U.S. which have and are experiencing
contrasting socio-economic conditions. The "rust belt" refers to those states primarily located in the upper
Midwest with a declining manufacturing employment base and an overall decline in socio-economic
conditions. In contrast, the "sun belt" refers to those states primarily located in the South which have
experienced growth related to increased employment opportunities and attractive "living conditions."
"8 In Ohio the municipalit may choose to have their financial statements audited by private sector Certified
Public Accountants, but the majority rely upon the state auditors,
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form, eliminating the possibility of data entry error. The database is located on a personal
computer to insure confidentiality. A filtered query of the U.S Census Bureau data
provided the name of the municipality, state locatio d population of the 147
municipalities in Florida and 168 municipalities in Ohio which had populations of 10,000
or greater.
To personalize the cover letter and to reduce "coverage error"(Dillman, 2007, pp.
198-204) compilation of the names and addresses for the finance officers in the sampling
frame was captured utilizing several sources. In Ohio, each municipality is required to
submit their annual financial report for publication on the state auditor's website.
Information regarding the name and address of the municipality's finance officer and
address is typically provided in the annual financial report. The information obtained
from the electronically published financial statements was verified from the websites for
the individual cities. For thos 0ho municipalities which did not ye a recent fancial
statement posted to the state auditor's website, a search was conducted for a website for
the municipality. Finally, if the name and address of the finance officer was not
published on the state auditor's website or a website for the individual municipality, a
phone call w placed to the respective ciy offices.
Florida does not require municipalities to provide their annual financial
statements for publication at a state sponsored website. As an alternative the name and
address for finance officer was acquired from the individual websites of the
municipalities. For those Florida runicipalities which did not have a website, a phone
call was placed to the respective city offices. Two Florida municipalities were eliminated
38
from her processing because they "contracted out" the operation of their finance
departments.
All of the data regarding the names and addresses of the finance officers was
entered into the Access database and verified by an independent party to assure data entry
errors were minimized. The database of 145 municipalities from Florida and 168
municipalities from Ohio was merged with Microsoft Word@ for preparing the cover
letters and survey questionnaires mailed to the targeted population of 313. There were no
undeliverable mailings returned as a result of incorrect addresses.
Survey Instment Design, Processes, and Procedures
The literature acknowledges a declining response rate to mailed surveys. Cycyota
and Harrison (2006) found that reported response rates to surveys mailed to executives in
widely cited journals in management for the period of 1992 through 2003 had an average
response rate of 34% and had significantly declined dug the period. Larson (2005)
reported similar findings regarding the response rates of professionals in logistics with a
high of 39.6% in 1990 to 14.1% in 2003. Nonresponse gives rise to concern about the
generaliazability of the results of research and the general recommendation to reduce
nonresponse is to follow best practices (Blair & Zinkhan, 2006).
Acknowledging that chief financial officers of municipalities are executives that
may have "less time and energy to spend on pro bono, low-priority behaviors such as
survey completion" as well as possibly having some reservations about lack of
confidentiality as a result "suns hie laws," effort was de to utilize "response rate
enhancement techniques" (Cycyota & Harrison, 2006, p. 135). In the current study the
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following techniques were utilized (see Dilinan, 2007; Larson, 2005; Greer,
Chuchinprakarn, & Seshadri, 2000; Cycyota & Harrison, 2006):
1. First mailing of cover letter and questionnaire was made on June 27, 2005 and a
second follow-up mailing to non-respondents was made on July 25, 2005.
2. Each mailing was sent to the municipality address and included the cover letter,
questionnaire, and pre-addressed and pre-paid return envelope. The return
envelopes were addressed to a post office x to itigate the loss of any
responses.
3. Each cover letter was on FIU letterhead and included an inside address, personal
lutation, and was individually signed. The body of the cover letter explained
what was being requested, why the respondent was selected, usefulness of the
survey, statement of confidentiality, token of appreciation, willingness to answer
any questions the recipient may have, d a thank you.
4. The questionnaire was a two page document printed on both sides (total of four
pages).
A copy of the cover letters and questionnaire are provided in Appendix A.
Questionnaire Development
When the questionnaire was sent to the target population in the summer of 2005,
it was recog ed that municipal finance officers might not conversant with the key
components of SOX or what the requirements of POC and IAC would include when
applied to the public sector. In addressing this particular challenge the survey instrument
included an explanation of major provisions of both POC and IAC. This was done to
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minimize any discrepancy between the researcher's and respondents' concept of POC
and IAC (Fowler, 1998, 1992). Although the survey instrument included these
explanations, there was still an expectation that a certain number of respondents would
either not have an opinion or would still be uncertain of their opinion. To allow for those
without an opinion or uncertain of their opinion, the item responses included neutral or
no opinion as the middle alternative.
It was challenging to develop specific survey questions for a topic previously
unexplored. The goals of the research provided a general framework for the categories of
survey questions, but did not provide guidance on specific questions. To facilitate
development of the survey questions, the author reviewed prior research in similar areas,
and literature regarding responses to SOX in the private sector. With the help of an
assistant finance officer from Ohio and an assistant finance officer from Florida, as well
as advice from the dissertation committee, a questio nnie for pre-testing was developed.
The questionnaire was pretested on individuals who would have similar
knowledge and experience a municipal finance officer, but were not part of the target
population. The pre-testing group included: assistant chief financial officers, an assistant
city manager with an accon ting background, a researcher with GASB, and faculty
members. The pre-test group provided recommendations which were incorporated into
the questionnaire and were asked to provide feedback on the amount of time to complete
the questionnaire.
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Response Recording and Control
After confirming the questionnaire was completed the responses were recorded in
an Access® database. The database remained under the sole control of the researcher.
The data in the Access® database was electronically transferred to NCSS@ statistical
package program for analysis.
Elite Post-Survey Interviews
In order to add more clarity to some of the findings of the analysis ofthe results
of the interviews were arranged with "elite expers" from the government accounting-
auditing field. A "snowballing" sampling process w used to identify potential
interviewees. The respondents included practitioners from Florida (2) and Ohio (3), as
well as Academics (2), and a representative from the GASB (1).
The geographic dispersion of the interviewees did not permit personal meetings.
To interview the individuals an interactive web-based system was designed specifically
for this research project. This methodology provided a convenient and secure process for
the interviewee to participate in the interview at his/her convenience. The process
allowed for reviewing the responses and contacting the interviewee by telephone if
necessary.
Potential interviewees were sent a request asking for their participation Although
the request was tailored to each potential interviewee, the general format of the request
included statements regarding: 1) what the research project was about, 2) why their
interview was important, 3) who recommended contacting them (see example, Appendix
42
survey and some demographic information (Appendix B, p. B2-B3).
The request provided the link to the interview questions and a personalized log-in
and password. The interviewee was assured their responses would be held in strict
condence ad nevr disclosed his/her response. The interactive format allowed for
each interviewee to access the interview questions at their convenience. The interview
consisted of twelve open-ended questions, with number ten being different for those
interviewees from Ohio (Appendix B).
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS
BASIC QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS AND FACTOR ANALYSIS
Introduction
Th s is the first of two chapters devoted to presenting the findings from this
research. The first section of this chapter will focus on the basic quantitative findings
from the mailed s vey inst ment. For those variables which required a response on a 5-
point bi-polar "Li ert" scale (neutral or no opinion included) findings are presented with
frequency tables of count and percentage. For those variables related to prior behavior,
organizational and personal demographics, the frequency distribution of responses are
presented in a form appropriate for the data. In concluding the first part of this chapter
Chi-square tests are reported for the association of the organizational and demographic
variables with the adoption of sox-like requirements.
The second section of this chapter uses explorato factor analysis (EFA)
methodology to facilitate understanding of how municipal finance officers structure their
attitudes toward adoption of SOX-like requirements. The process begins with
eliminating those measured variables with low communality from the factor structure.
The process of selecting the appropriate number of factors to retain is then presented.
The second part of this chapter concludes with presenting the factor loadings and
inte rretation of the factor model selected. To her test whether the factor model
selected "makes sense," in the next chapter the SOX-like variables of interest will be
regressed upon the factor scores (Fabrig , Wegener, MacCallu & Strahan, 1999, p.
276).
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Mailed Survey Instrument
The author mailed surveys to all chief financial officers of municipalities in
Florida and Ohio 19  th populations of 10,000 or eater t at did not contract out their
finance/accounting function. Of the 313 mailed surveys, 132 or 42.2% returned usable
surveys in a timely manner. Cross-tabulation of received surveys against mailed
surveys showed no response bias by state or city size.
Table 4-1
Reponses by State
State Number Number Percentage
Mailed Received Received
Florida 145 64 44.1%
Ohio 168 68 40.5%
otal 313 132 42 2%
Table 4-2
Responses by City Size
In Percent (n in parentheses)
Cit Size (Population) Mailed Received
10,000 -25,000 58.1 56.8
(182) (75)
25,001 - 99,999 35.8 36.4
(112) (48)
100,000 or greater 6.1 6.8
(19) (9)
The survey asked about the attitudes of municipal finance officers toward the
required adoption of two major components of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX): Principal
Officer(s) Certification (POC) and Independent Audit Committees (IAC). In addition,
the respondents were asked to provide their opinions of specific consequences of POC
i9 Both Florida and Ohio require municipalities to publish their financial statements using the guidance
provided by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB).
20 In addition to the 132 usable surveys returned there was an additional four surveys received not included,
Two were incomplete, one was sent by fax and lost, and one completed survey was received too late.
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and LAC adoption; their general attitude about the recent changes i govermen t
accounting; some indication of prior adoption rate of changes in accounting practices; as
well as personal and organizational demographic variables.
SECTION 1 - BASIC QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS
Variable c/Interest- Principal Officer(s) Certification (POC)
Principal Officer(s) Certification (POC) is one of the major components of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). In a nutshell, it enhances accountability by assigning
personal responsibility for the accuracy of the financial reporting and disclosures to an
organization's chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO). In effect
the POC provision provides legal sanction to the view that management "owns" the
21
financial statements
Table 4-3
Should POC be implemented as a required practice?
In Percent (n in parentheses)
QuesionSA A N D SD
in gee, 1 believe principal officr(s) certfication 16 40 17 20 7
similr to SOX should be required of the principal (21) (53) (22) (27) (9)
officer(s) of municipalities.
Results in Table 4-3 suggest strong suppo for the general proosition of
principal officer certification (2/3 of the non-neutral responses either strongly agreed or
agreed). One interpretation of this finding is that our respondents view POC as a logical
extension of the "management representation letter" that 96.0% of our respondents
21 This is part of the "Expectations Gap" which has received a great deal of attention in the accounting
literature. The "Expectations Gap" generally refers to the difference in perception by various users
regarding who is responsible for the correctness of financial reporting and disclosures. For furher de ils
regarding the "Expectations Gap" see Hussain, 2003; MacEnroe & Martin, 2001; Gibson, Pany & Smith,
1998.
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already provide. This would appear to be consistent with the Theory of In ovation
Diffusion (TID) hypothesis that adoption of POC is more likely if it is similar to the
previous practices of providing a manement representation letter (Rogers, 1995, p. 15).
Another is that in the post-Enron era, a sizable portion of our respondents understand
how adoption of POC could better satisfy the increased public expectations for reliable
financial reporting. This would dovetail with the hypothesis from TID that an innovation
is more likely to be adopted if it is perceived as better than the idea it supersedes (Rogers,
1995, p. 15).
Table 4-4
If Your City was Required, or Voluntarily Adopted, Principal Officer(s) Certification,
Who Should Sign and Attest to the Accuracy and Completeness?
Breakdown by Position
In Percent (n in parentheses)
POSITION SA A N D SD
Chief Financial Officer 71 24 4
(94 (32) (5) - (1)
City Manager 40 26 28 3 3
(53) (34) (37) (4) (4)
The Mayor 14 22 31 16 17
(19) (29) (41) (21) (22)
City Commissioners 4 8 46 19 23
(5) (10) (61) (25) (31)
The findings shown in Table 4-4 regarding "who" should sign and attest to the
accuracy and completeness of the financial statements evidence an interesting
bureaucratic-political split. On the one hand, there appears to be almost universal support
(99% of those with an opinion) for the CFO's attestation, as well as very strong support
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for city managers. But support for mayoral attestation is mixed at best", and for the
commissioners, there is 42% opposition.
One interpretation of these findings is that our respondents see the CFO and city
manager as directly responsible for financial operations and cognizant of daily
operations. This is consistent with a Weberian-Wilsonian politics/administration
dichotomy, i.e., the bureaucracy having the expertise needed for meaning 1 attestation
with the elected "dilettante" commissioners, who are primarily part-time, having neither
the time nor knowledge needed for this task (Bendor, Taylor, & Van Gaalen, 1985, p.
1041).
This interpretation takes on, however, some thought-provoking normative
connotations. In essence it suggests the non-elected principal officers see limited
obligation for the elected officials-including those responsible for appropriations-to
attest to the completeness and accuracy of the CAFR. The embedded assumption,
consistent with the Convergence Model2 (CM), is that appointed (or in the case of Ohio,
possibly elected) finance officers and city managers can exercise sufficient stewardship
despite their unelected status. This squares with the framers' view of SOX for the
corporate sector, who believe that CEO's and CFO's are those ultimately responsible for
the integrity of the financial disclosures.
22 Support for mayorial attestation may be overstated and ciy manager understated. Approximately 2/3rds
of those who strongly agreed or agreed with the having the mayor sign and attest to the financial statements
were from municipalities in which the mayor is considered the chief administrative officer. In these
"strong mayor" arrangements there may not be a city manager which would obviate the choice of the city
manager.
23 Convergence Model (CM) refers to the adoption of business-like measurement, reporting, and control
techniques and procedures in the financial reporting process of governmental entities.
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If POC is required of municipalities the issue of who should sign and attest would
need to be addressed. In the corporate sector the CEO and CFO have jointly been
expected to have the knowledge of and responsibility for financial reporting. The POC
requirement provided legal sanction to the expectation and provided for personal
penalties. In the municipal sector the mayor d ci council already ve political
accountability and at least implied legal responsibility for honest financial reporing. The
question in the governmental sector is whether it is reasonable to expect the elected
officials to have the requisite knowledge to meaningfully attest to the accuracy of the
financial reports?
Perceptions of Benefits and Costs Associated with POC Adoption
TABLE 4-5
Potential Benefits Associated with a Municipality Either Being Required or Voluntarily
Adopting Principal Officer(s) Certification
In Percent (n in parentheses)
Question SA A N D SD
Increase theimportance of the CAFR as an instrument of 11 30 23 31 4
accountability (FR-ACCT) (15) (40) (31) (41) (5)
Enhance e responsible financial reporting image of the 13 40 25 18 4
municipality (FR-IMAGE) (17) (53) (33) (24) (5)
Encourage the municipality's elected leadership to become 11 31 30 23 5
more involved in the financial reporting process.(EL- (14) (41) (40) (30) (7)
INVOLV) 
__
Encourage muni's admin. leadership to becorne more 11 51 17 17 3
involved in financial reporting proess. (ADM-INVOLV) (15) (67) (23) (23) (4)
Reduce the risk of lawsuits (LAWRISK) 2 8 34 44 12
(3) (10) (45) (58) (16)
Encourage a more positive atitude toward disclosure among 7 36 27 25 5
the municipality's adminleadership and staff (DISCLOSE) (9) (47) (36) (33) (7)
Con ibute to more favorable bond ratings (BONDRATE) 8 26 39 20 6
(11) (34) (52) (27) (8)
Table 4-5 results may shed further light on the conceptual support for requiring
POC reflected in Table 4-3. A plurality of respondents either agree or strongly agree that
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POC will enhance the relative value of the CAFR as a tool for accountability (FR-ACCT),
encourage elected leadership to become more involved in the reporting process (EL-
INVOLV), and encourage a more positive attitude toward disclosure among the
administrative leadership and staff (DISCLOSURE). In addition, a majority of respondents
(53%) either agree or strongly agree with POC serving to enhance the community's
reporting image (FR-IMAGE), ad a sizable majority (62%) believes that POC will
encourage the city's administration to become more involved in the financial reporting
process (ADM-iNVOLV). On the other hand, there is ambivalence reg ding the value of
POC's value as a tool for enhancing bond ratings (BONDRA TE), and a majority (66%)
does not believe POC would reduce the risk of lawsuits (LA SK). These findings
suggest that while POC may induce greater intangible benefits such as participation in the
financial reporting process and enhanced importance and reporting image, our
respondents may not immediately recognize tangible rewards in reduced cost of operation
(e.g., better bond ratings, less litigation) through its implementation.
TABLE 4-6
Potential Implementation Issues (Costs) Associated with a Municipality Adopting
Principal Officer(s) Certification
In percent (n in parentheses)
Question SA A N D SD
The non-financial principal executive/administatve officers 19 45 14 19 2
would unwillng to make the effo to ome sufficiently (25) (60) (19) (25) (3)
knowi geable about financial repoting ad discos e
(FRKNOW)
The non-financial principal executive & administrative officers 19 39 22 18 2
would be unwilling to make the effo to become sufficiently (25) (52) (29) (24) (2)
owlegeable about appropriate internal conol pr oedures
(ICKNOW)
The si ing principal officers would be personally concerned 31 35 18 14 2
w potential nal penalties (CRIMINAL) (41) (46) (24) (19) (2)
The cost of implementing the policy would be greater the 23 32 35 8 2
benefits derived (COST>BENE))(1) (42) (46) (11) (2)
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Findings in Table 4-6 indicate some concern regarding the qualification of would-
be attesters. On the face of it, the principal officers with financial management training
and public sector experience would be qualified. This may not be the case for many
elected officials or others with limited financial management training. This pool of
prospective attesters is probably u cc omed to an operating environent dominated
by traditional fund accounting despite the possibility of having some business
background. Others who ye a broader soci science or public management
background may be seriously lacking in the rudiments of accounting or financial
management in either sector (Jones, 1991; Kattelus, Cheng, & Engstrom, 2005). This
concern is shown Table 4-6, where the majority of our respondents indicate that non-
financial officers may be unwilling to take the time needed to become sufficiently
knowledgeable about financial reporting and internal control (FRKNOW & ICKNOW).
This huan resource dimension is noteworthy and subject to two diferent
inte retations. One is that of face value. Our respondents may have an objective read
on the potential pool of non-financial principals and see few who could serve in this role.
A less sanguine interpretation could be drawn from the Public Choice perspective,
especially the Niskanen model (1971), and doveta ls with our findings in Table 4-4.
From this vantage, the bureaucracy may impute a limited human resources pool. In
reality, they may be uncomfortable with non-financial principals (especially elected
officials) acquiring financial expertise that would co uterbalance that found in the
bureaucracy, resulting in a loss of influence over financial managenent (Miller & Moe,
1983, p. 297; Stiglitz, 1988, p. 207; Hirsch, 1970, p. 22). Regardless of interpretation, our
respondents see a human resources deficit with regard to implementation of POC.
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Responses in Table 4-6 also raise some questions regarding the benefits and costs
of implementing POC. A majority (55%) of our respondents either agrees or strongly
agrees that the cost of implementing POC would exceed the benefits (COST>BENE), while
the modal response was neutral or no opinion. On the face of it, this finding would seem
to be in contradiction to the support for POC reflected in Table 4-3. On the other hand,
this contradiction is perhaps mitigated by the findings in Table 4-5 which showed the
respondents perceived intangible benefits, e®g. greater administration involvement in
financial reporting practices and enhancement of the financial reporting image of the
entity. When viewed in this light, the results may be suggesting that required POC is
supported not because the pecuniary benefits are greater than the cost, but rather as a
result of the importance attached with non-pecuniary benefits.
The principal objection to POC adoption appears to be the personal exposure to
criminal pe lties. The well publicized image of Enron's Ken Ley and others ing
handcuffed could well have influenced the respondents concern with potential criminal
and civil penalties. In Table 4-6, two-thirds of our respondents agree or strongly agree
with the possibility that POC opens the door to potential criminal penalty (CRIMINAL).
This squares with our findings in Table 4-5, where 56% did not see POC as reducing the
risk of lawsuits. The upshot is that univariate analysis of responses in Tables 4-5 and 4-6
suggests that respondents may view POC as "opening the door" for cr iinal and civil
litigation.
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Variable of Interest - Independent Audit Committee IA )
Symbolically and legally, the attestation (POC) is critical. Substantially however
the implementation of an independent audit committee (IAC) d related internal control
requirements (section 404) may be SOX's greater contribution and its more onerous
burden. Adoption of an IAC introduces a set of checks and balances into financial
management with particular emphasis on bolstering internal controls and expectations of
greater independence and financial owledge being possessed by members of the audit
committee. The framers of SOX apparently felt that independent and knowledgeable
members of an audit committee were important to the assurance process. This view has
been documented ir prior research (Farber, 2005; Beasley, 1996, Dechow, Sloan, &
Sweeney, 1996) and emphasized by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission (COSO) (Auditing Standards Committee, 2007; COSO, 1994).
Table 4-7
Attitudes toward Implementing Mandatory Independent Audit Committee:
Need for Implementation by Size of Community
In Percent (n in parentheses)
COMMUNITY SIZE SA A N D SD
100,000 or greater 23 36 20 16 6
(30) (47) (26) (21) (8)
25,001-99,999 5 24 33 27 11
(7) (32) (44) (35) (14)
Under 25,000 2 16 23 36 22
(3) (21) (31) (48) (29)
Results in Table 4-7 reflect the attitudes of the all respondents from communities
of different sizes on three different variables:
1. Should large communities be required to implement IAC?
2. Should medium sized communities be required to implement IAC?
3. Should small communities be required to implement IAC?
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In broad relief, our respondents see IAC as best suited for large communities"4 ,
with mixed support for medium sized communities, and significant opposition to
implementation for smaller communities. This is directly analogous to the staged SOX
implementation in the private sector. Apparently many of our respondents believe that
implementing IAC would benefit larger cities with more complex operations, and the
financial means and technical capacity to support roll-out.
While findings in Table 4-7 indicate support for larger communities adopting
IAC; findings in Table 4-8 may reflect the "real" attitudes toward IAC adoption. Table
4-8 reflects the attitude of the respondents for required adoption of IAC in communities
which are the same size as the respondent's community.
Table 4-8
Support for Independent Audit Com ittee I lementation
by Respondent's Community Size
In Percent (n in parentheses)
Question SA A N D SD
Should muicipalities which are the same size as my 5 20 23 32 20
communit be required to have an LAG with (7I2) (0 4)(7
responsibilities similar to the requirements of SOX?
Results in Table 4-8 suggest strong opposition to requiring IAC adoption (2/3 of
those who had an opinion either strongly disagreed or disagreed with required
24 There is some evidence of support for large city implementation resulting from medium and small sized
communities hoisting the requirement on large communities. However, cross-tabulation of the variable
"Should --ge communities be required to implement IAC" with the communit size of the respondents
resulted in: x2 of .93, df. = 8, prob.= 0.3483, two-tailed; suggesting the null hypothesis of no difference
could not be rejected.
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adoption2 5 ). Part of this opposition may reflect an accounting version of the NIMBY
(not-in-my-back-yard) phenomenon observed in zoning and environmental policy.
Another factor may be that only 29% of our respondents have audit committees in their
respective cormunities, suggesting an element of inexperience with this concept and
perhaps "fea of the unknown." Innovation diffusion theory suggests that lack of
experience with audit committees is likely to increase the uncertainty of the perceived
consequences of adopting an IAC; therefore increasing the likelihood of opposition to
adoption (Rogers, 1983, p. 21).
Perceptions of Benefits and Costs Associated with IAC Adoption
TABLE 4-9
Benefits Associated with a Municipality Either Being Required or Voluntarily Adopting
an Independent Audit Committee
In Percent (n in parentheses)
Question SA A N D SD
FR-ACCT 9 26 30 30 6
(12) (34) (39) (39) (8)
FR-IMAGE 9 36 30 22 4
(12) (47) (39) (29) (5)
EL-INVOLV 8 36 23 29 5
(11) (47) (30) (38) (6)
ADM-INVOLV 8 36 27 23 5
(11) (47) (36) (31) (7)
AWRISK 2 8 33 45 12
(3) (11) (43) (59) (16)
DISCLOSE 5 30 34 25 7
(6) (39) (45) (33) (9)
BONDRATE 5 27 37 25 7
(6) (35) (49) (33) (9)
25 While 2/3 of those who had an opinion either strongly disagreed or disagreed with 1AC adoption, there is
evidence that smaller cities have greater opposition. One-half of the large cities, 56% of the medium sized
cities, and 77% of the small cities who had an opinion strongly disagreed or disagreed with 1AC
implementation. This is not statistically significant (x2 = 8.6168, d.f = 8, p = 0.3756, two-tailed)
suggesting the null hypothesis of no difference could not be rejected.
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Findings in Table 4-9 give some idea as to why support for IAC is lacking. A
plurality believes IAC will provide intangible benefits by enhancing the responsible
financial reporting image for the municipality (FR-IMAGE) ad encourage greater
involvement by the elected and administrative leadersh p (EL-INVOLV & ADM-INVOLV).
However, relatively few of our respondents see intangible benefits such as increasing the
importance of the CAFR as an instrument of accountability (FR-ACCT) or encouraging a
more positive attitude toward disclosure reporting anong the adnirative leadership
and staff (DISCLOSE). With regard to tangible benefits, only 1/3,d of our respondents see
IAC as resulting in improved bond ratings (BoNDRATE) and only 10% agree or strongly
agree that it will reduce lawsuits (LAWRISK). On the whole, there is generally less
agreernent to the nefits of IAC when compared to POC (Table 4-5).
Findings in Table 4-10 provide her explanation for our respondents' lack of
support for IAC adoption. Sizable proportions of our respondents seem to believe that
establishment of this financial "shadow-bureaucracy" as it were, would be difficult
(ELCONTROL & ADMCONTROL). Our respondents are concerned that both elected
officials and senior executive officials will lose their autonomy with regard to external
auditors under an IAC regime. May of o res ndents seem to question if they will be
able to secure a complement of owledgeable members (PERSONNEL & EXPERT). And
lastly, 53% our respondents show agreement with the proposition that the costs of
implementing IOC will outweigh the benefits (COST>BENE).
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TABLE 4-10
Implementation Issues (Costs) Associated with a Municipality Adopting an Independent
Audit Committee
In Percent (n in parentheses)
Question SA A N D SD
The independent audit committee would be viewed by
elected officials as having too much control over the 14 33 27 21 5
selection, reten ion, nd comm ication with the independent (19) (43) (36) (28) (6)
auditors LCONTROL)
The idpendnt audit committee would be viewed by the
Executive/Administative leadership as having too much 14 41 26 17 3
control over the selection, retention, and communication wi (18) (54) (34) (22) (4)
the external auditors (ADMCONTROL)
It would be very difficult to find individuals from our
community who qualiy and would be willing to serve on the 29 27 17 23 4
independent audit committee (PERSONNEL) (38) (36) (22) (31) (5)
It would be very difficult to find an individual from our
community who is both an accounting "expert" and familiar 36 30 17 14 4
with the role and activities of a municipality (47) (39) (23) (18) (5)
(EXPERT)_____ 
_______
COS BENE 24 29 36 10 2
(32) (38) (47) (13) (2)
Attitudes Regarding the Orientation of Government Accounting
The municipal reporting model required by GASB 34 incorporates many
business-like measurements for reporting transactions and balances (GASB 34, 1999,
para. 305). This CM has thus far centered on what is reported and how it is measured
(relevance). If adopted, the POC and IAC provisions would broaden the CM in the
governmental sector by addressing issues of defined accountability and enhanced
independence of those involved in the assurance process (reliability).
The CM can be seen as blurring distinctions between the public and private
sector. The recent New Public Management (NPM) movement, as well as the municipal
reform movement which occurred during the early decades of the twentieth century, have
supported governments adopting business-like processes and procedures (Boyne, 2002).
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On the other hand, many public administration scholars (Sayre, 1958; Allison, 1979)
have argued that governments and business are so fundamentally unalike that adoption of
business-like practices by the governmental sector "ould at best fruitless and at worst
counterproductive" (Boyne, 2002, p. 98).
The well documented public/private dichotomy literature has not provided a
robust resolution of which private sector processes and techniques should, or can, be
adopted in the public sector (Berman & West, 1998; Boyne, 2002). As a result, it is
anticipated that individuals will have varying perspectives regarding public-private
differences and similarities. For example, when the initial draft of GASB 34 was
released for comment, there was both expressed support for, and opposition to, the
proposed measrement focus and basis of accounting (MFBA) to be used in the
government-wide statements (GASB 34, 1999, para. 305).
The question is whether the attitudes and beliefs of the respondents regarding
required POC and IAC adoption reflect how municipal finance officers' view the CM?
The responses in Table 4-11 provide evidence of their view of the CM as related to the
municipal reporting requirements of GASB 34.
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Table 4-11
Attitudes toward Orientation of Government Accounting
In Percent (n in parentheses)
Question ]SA A N D SD]
Municipalities owe a greater responsibility to the average
citizen to be publicly accountable than private enterprises 24 33 11 28 5
owe t eir investors (RESPONSIILITY) (32) (43) (14) (37) (6)
Statement 34 and subsequent statements are moving
municipal financial reporting and disclosure to the 13 58 1 14 5
orientation of financial reporting and disclosure of private (17) (77) (14) (18) (6)
enterrises (CO E RGENCE)
The fnancial reporting and disclosures of municipalities
should more closely resemble the finacial reporing and 4 26 21 40 9
disclosures of private enterprises. (CONVERGENCE (5) (34) (28) (53) (12)
ACCEPTANCE)___ 
__
The financial reporting and disclosures of municipalities
should provide information which helps the average citizen 39 55 3 2 2
to better understand the role and activities of the municipality (51) (73) (4) (2) (2)
(INFORMATION)___ 
__
Changes in municipal reporting as a result of Statement 34
and subsequent statements provides information which is 5 28 25 24 18
more useful to the aver e citizen in uderstding e role (6) (37) (33) (32) (24)
and activities of the municipality (USEFULNESS)
Analysts at Touche Ross observed over three decades ago that successful
implementation of financial reporting must be "what makes sense and best serves users"
(Touche Ross, 1977, p. 5). The responses in Table 4-11 suggest that there may be a
significant difference between the goals and objectives of GASB via Statement 34 and
successors, and what the financial officers see as making sense to the "average citizen."
While 94% of the respondents strongly agree or agree that financial reporting should help
average citizens tter understand municipal functions and roles (IORMATION), only
1/3 of the respondents view adoption of the GASB 34 reporting model as benefiting the
average citizen's knowledge of municipal operations (UsEFULNESS). The lack of
usefulness analogues with the observation that the current reporting model is complex
and difficult to read and interpret (Gauthier, 2007b, p. 9; Chase & Phillips, 2004, p. 27)
and consistent with the recommendation by the Gover ent Finance Officers
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Association (GFOA) of a Popular Annual Financial Report (PAFR) for use by the
average citizen (Montondon & Lilley, 2005, p. 53).
A clear majority of the respondents view the GASB 34 reporting model as
reflecting a business-like orientation (CONVERGENCE); on the other hand, less than 1/3
strongly agree or agree that the GASB 34 reporting model should more closely resemble
the private sector model (CONVERGENCE ACCEPTANCE). While the findings indicate the
respondents' view that the GASB 34 reporting model does inco rate a business-like
orientation, the municipal finance officers have some hesitation with this business-like
orientation.
A majority (57%) of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed that municipalities
owe a greater responsibility to the average citizen to be publicly accountable than private
enterprises owe to their investors (RESPONSIBILITY). On the face of it, this indicates an
endorsement by municipal chief financial officers' of the importance of accounting to the
lfillment of public accountability. This conforms with Paul Posner's (2006)
observation that accountability in the public sector has "grown to an iconic status" and
those in the "accountability professions are its most vigilant advocates" (p. 72). Stephen
Page (2006) has suggested the greater emphasis on accountability has resulted from the
new public management (NPM) reforms, which includes the CM, by "granting public
managers and line staff increased flexibility in exchange for incre ed acco tabiity" (p.
167).
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Innovation Adoption Rate
TID recognizes differences between "early adopters" and "late adopters"
suggesting there are individuals or organizatio which will tend to accept innovations
earlier than others (Rogers, 1995, p. 263-280). Conceptually related is TPB research
which has suggested that measuring prior behavior may improve the prediction of later
behavior (Ajzen, 2002). For these reasons survey questions were included which
measured prior instances of early adoption of GASB Statements 34 and 44.
Table 4-12
Adoption Rate of GASB 34
Frequency Percent
Early implementer 39 29.6
I lemented as rescribed 87 65.9
Late mplementer 4 3.0
Not peee .
To 132 10
Table 4-13
Adoption Rate of GASB 44
I lement early 22 16.7
Will implement as prescribed 67 50.7
No decision on implementation 43 32.6
Total 132 100
Cross tabulation of ADOPTION RATE 34 with ADOPTION RATE 44 showed
significant association (prob. : 0.05) indicating those municipalities which did adopt
GASB 34 either early or as prescribed also had either adopted GASB 44 early or were
planning to adopt GASB 44 when prescribed. However, cross tabulation of required
POC (Table 4-3) and required IAC (Table 4-8) with either ADOPTIN RATE 34 or
ADOPTION RATE 44 indicated no significant mea e of association between the adoption
61
rates and attitudes toward required POC and IAC. This finding suggests a limited
relationship between the adoption rate of accounting rules and implementation of new
auditing regulations.
Organizational and Personal Characteristics
Cross-tabulation between the variables of interest- required POC (Table 4-3) and
required IAC (Table 4-8) - against the organizational and personal characteristics
measued had no significant measure of association between the demographic variables
and attitudes toward required POC or establishment of an IAC. This finding is consistent
with TPB, suggesting that formation of an attitude toward a specific act is determined
from the individual evaluations of the consequences of such an act (Azjen, 1988, p. 150);
rather than organizational and personal demographics.
Personal Demographics of Respondents
Table 4-14
Gender
Gender Frequency Pe cent e
Female 45 34.1
Male 87 65.9
Total 132 100
Table 4-15
Age
Age Frequency Percentage
Under 26 0 0.0
26 to 35 8 6.1
36 to 45 32 24.2
46to55 61 46.2
56 to 65 26 19.7
Over 65 5 3.8
Total 132 100
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Table 4-16
Education
Education Frequency Percent
High School Diploma 10 7.6
Associates Degree 5 3.8
Bachelors Degree 71 53.8
Masters Degree 41 31.0
Doctorate Degree 3 2.3
Law Degree 2 1.5
Total 132 100
Table 4-17
Certified Public Accountants
Certified Public Accountant Frequency Percent
CPA 66 50.0
Non-CPA 66 50.0
Total 132 100
Organizational Demographics of Respondents' Communities
Table 4-18
State Location
te Freuenc Percent
Florida 64 48.5
Oho / 68 51.50100Tota1 132 100
Table 4-19
City Size
mSize byPopulation Fre e -Percent
Small (1,00 2,00 7 5.Medium (25,001 - 99,999) 48 36.4
Large (100,000 or more) 9 6.8
Total 132 100
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Table 4-20
Chief Administrative Officer of Municipality
Chief Administrative Officer Frequency Percent
City Manager 81 61.4
Mayor 41 31.0
Other 10 7.6
Total 132 100
Table 4-21
Selection of Chief Financial Officer
Appointment/Election of CFO Frequency Percent
Appointed by City Manager 63 47.7
Appointed by City Coui/Mayor 45 34.1
Elected 24 18.2
Total 132 100
Table 4-22
Chief Financial Officer Directly Reports to Whom
CFO reports to Frequenc Percent
Citizen (when elected) 24 18.2
City Council/Mayor 35 26.5
City Manager 64 48.5
Assistant City Manager 4 3.0
Other 5 3.8
Total 132 100
Does your city provide a management representation letter? (96.2%)
Does your city currently have an audit committee? (29.5%)
SECTION 2 - HOW MUNICIPAL FINANCE OFFICERS STRUCTURE
ATTITUDES TOWARD ADOPTION OF SOX-LIKE REQUIREMENTS
Summaries of the responses to the individual variables of the survey have been
provided in section one as a way of describing what the data shows. In this section of the
chapter the focus shifts from analysis of individual variables to groups of variables.
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Exploratory factor analysis is utilized to gain insight into how and in what way the
measured or observed variables "cluster or hang together" (Stevens, 1996, p. 362) and to
"facilitate the understanding of the relations that exist between the observed variables"
(Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1998, p. 265).
Organization of Research Instrument
The research survey instrument contained twenty-three items to measure specific
consequences (favorable and unfavorable) associated with the specific acts of POC and
IAC adoption. These twenty-three independent variables were categorized in the survey
instrument as follows:
1. Potential favorable outcomes associated with the adoption of POC (Table 4-5).
2. Potential favorable outcomes associated with the adoption of IAC (Table 4-9).
3. Reservations or concerns associated with the adoption of POC (Table 4-6).
4. Reservations or concerns associated with the adoption of IAC (Table 4-10).
An additional category included in the EFA analysis was those five independent
variables from:
5. General beliefs about the appropriateness of the GASB 34 prescribed reporting
model (Table 4-11)
The beginning domain of independent variables considered in the EFA analysis
includes the above five groups which represent twenty-eight measured variables in total.
The organizational and personal demographics as well as the adoption rate variables
(Tables 4-12 and 4-13) are nominal variables and not included.
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Factor Analysis
This is an initial study of the acceptability of required POC and IAC. As such, the
strong prior knowledge necessary to utilize confirmatory factor analysis is not present
(Stevens, 1996, p. 389; Henson & Roberts, 2006, 2006, p. 395). Without prior
knowledge of the number of observed variables to include in the factor analysis, which
measured variables will "load" on a particular factor, or how many factors are present in
the dataset; exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is the "more sensible approach" for this
study (Fabriger, Wegener, MacCullum, & Strahan, 1999, p. 277).
In addressing the issue of what observed variables to retain in the analysis,
MacCullum, Widaman, Zhang, & Hong (1999) have emphasized the importance of
removing variables with low com alities to increase the quality of the re lts (p. 96).
Fabrigar et al. (1999) support the removal of low communality variables because
"variables with low reliability will have low com lities....[and] A second reaon why
a variable might have a low communality is that the variable is unrelated to the domain of
interest and thus shares little in common with other measured variables in that domain"
(p. 273).
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Table 4-23
Communalities
Principal Axis Method - No Rotation
(Convergence in 6 Factors)
Observed Variable Communality
Specific benefits (POC)
FR-ACCT (POC) 0.687
FR-IMAGE (POC) 0.760
EL-INVOLV (POC) 0.510
ADM-INVOLV (POC) 0.585
LAWRISK (OC) 0.670
DISCLOSE (POC) 0.664
BONDRATE (POC) 0.541
FR-A CCT (-AC) 0.649
FR-IMAGE AC) 0.665
EL-IN VOLV (IAC) 0.596
ADM-INVOLV (IAC) 0.683
LAWRISK (IAC) 0.641
DISCLOSE (IAC) 0.683
BONDRATE (IAC) 0.697
Specific unfavorable consequences (POC)
FRKNOW 0.881
ICKNOW 0.813
CRIMINAL 0.266
COSTBENE (POC) 0.519
Specific unfavorable consequences (IAC)
ELCNTRL. 0.587
A ICONTRL, 0.658
PERSONNEL 0.675
EXPFERT 0.709
COST>BENE (IAC) 0.634
General Beliefs about GASB 34
RESPONSIBILITY 0.107
CONVERGE 0.339
CONVERGE ACCEPTANCE 0.219
INFORMATION 0.072
USEFULNESS 0.312
In Table 4-23, except for the observed variable "CRIMINAL," all of the low
communalities (shown in bold) are with the observed variables from the category of
"general beliefs about GASB 34." The low communalities of the observed variables
included in the "general beliefs about GASB 34" is sufficient reason to eliminate this
category from further consideration in the factor analysis (MacCullum, Wildaman,
Zhang, & Hong, 1999; Fabrigar et al., 1999).
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Having identified the twenty-three observed variables to retain for analysis the
next analytical step was to determine the number of factors to retain. The determination
of the number of factors to retain has been described as "likely to be the most important
decision a researcher will make" (Zwick & Velicer, 1986, p. 432). The "indeterminacy"
of factor analysis (Maraun, 1996; Stevens, 1996) has led to the development of several
heuristics and guidelines for selecting the factor model using statistical rationale as well
as subjective judgment (Conway & Hoffcutt, 2003, p. 152; Fabrigar et al, 1999, p. 283;
Henson & Roberts, 2006, p. 396).
The un-rotated data converged 6 at the si factor model, indicating an upper limit
of extracting no more than six factors. The factor loadings shown in Table 4-24 represent
the correlation between the observed variable and the factor or group of observed
variables selected. The first two factors contained at least six highest valued factor
loadings (shown bold), factor 3 contained just two variables and factors four through
six only extracted one variable. It is also noted the variables extracted in factors four
through six are complex variables which have higher loadings on factors one and two.
Considering only the number of variables defining a factor and the magnitude of their
factor loadings, suggests the two or maybe three factor model would be reliable
(Guadagnoli and Velicer, 1988, p. 274).
26 Convergence occurs when ere is very little or no variance remaining to be accounted for.
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Table 4-24
Factor Loadings equal to or greater than 10.401 value
Principal Axis Method - No Rotation
23 Observed Variables
(Bold indicates the highest factor loading for individual variables)
Observed Variables Factors _______
2 3 5 6
FR-ACCT (POC) 0.733
FR-IMAGE (POC) 0.774
EL-INVOLV (POC) 0.6 1 
_
ADM-INVOLV (POC) 0.611_________
LAWRISK (POC) 0.590 -0.427
DISCLOSE OC) 0.740
BONDRA TE (POC) 0.656
FR- (A) 0.779
FR-IMAGE (IAC) 0.728
EL-ICNVOLVQAC) 0.712
ADM-INVOLV (IAC) 0.735
LAWRISK C) 0.665
DISCLOSE (IAC) 0.723
BONDRATE (IAC) 0.721 0465
FRKNOW 0.510 -0725
ICKNOW 0.546 -0.667
CRIMINAL
COSTBE (POC) -0.432 0,459
ELCONTROL 0.471 0.404
ADMCONTROL 0.574
PERSONNEL 0.659
EXPERT 0.668
COST>BENE (IAC) 0.626
In addition to analysis of the factor loadings, two popular rules for determining
the number of factors to retain have en Kaiser's "eigenvalue greater than one" rule and
Cattell's "scree test" (Henson & Roberts, 2006; Conway & Hoffcutt, 2003).
Computation of the factor eigenvalues of the unrotated data suggests four factors should
be retained. The scree test suggested three factors should be retained. Consideration of
the analysis of factor loadings, Kaiser's rule and Cattrell's scree test suggests the number
of factors to retain should be either the 2-factor model, 3-factor model, or the 4-factor
model.
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Prior to making a final decision on the number of factors to retain, the factors will
be rotated "to find a more interpretable solution" (Conway & Hoffcutt, 2003, p. 152). As
Fabrigar et al. (1999) observed: "A model that fails to produce a rotated solution th t is
interpretable and theoretically sensible has little value" (p. 281). Results shown in Table
4-25 were obtained using the principal axis method with varimax orthogonal rotation.
Table 4-25
Alternative Factor Extraction Models
Principal As Method - Va x Rotation
Factors Extracted
Model 1 2 3 4 Cum. %
2 Factor n 14 8
e 7.14 3.04 95.8
a 0.93 .80
3Factor n 14 6 3
e 7.17 2.66 1.96 97.0
a 0.93 0.80 0.79
4Factor n 10 6 3 8
e 4.63 2.64 1.96 3.81 97.5
a 0.91 0.80 0.79 0.90
n = number of observed variables in factor
e = eigenvalue of factor
a = cronbach's alpha of factor
Most of the metrics reported in Table 4-25 for the 2-factor, 3-factor, and 4-factor
models suggest any of the mode would work equally well. The cumulative percentages
after rotation are all greater than 90%. The reliability (cronbach's alpha) for each factor
is acceptable (0.79 to 0.93). The number of observed variables in each of the factors is
equal to or greater than three (Fabrigar et al., 1999, p. 274).
The 4-factor model, which w included because of selection by Kaiser's rule, is
eliminated for several reasons. The factor structure includes four complex variables
(variables with high loadings on more than one factor) which is undesirable following the
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Combining statistical rationale with substantive judgment, argument for selecting
either the 2-factor model or 3-factor model could be made (Conway & Hoffcutt, 2003, p.
152; Fabrigar et al, 1999, p. 283; Henson & Roberts, 2006, p. 396). They both have
Thurstone's simple structure and factor 1 in both models contains all of the favorable
consequences. On the other hand, neither model derived from EPA is "ideal" in the
selection and distribution of negative consequences. Factor 2 of the 2-factor model did
not select the negative consequence (CRIMINAL). The "problem" with the 3-factor model
was the inclusion of COST>BENE (POC) in the second factor (which selected all of the IAC
negative consequences) and excluded COST>BENE (POC) from the third factor (which
selected the remaining POC negative consequences). Although both models have
"interpretable" factors (Zwick & Velicer, 1986, p. 440), "Occam's Razor" or "principle
of parsimony" suggests the choice of the 2-factor model.
Interpretability of 2 Factor Model
The 2-factor model which emerged from the EFA analytic protocol provided a
solution which is "interpretable and theoretically sensible" (Fabrigar et al., 1999, p. 281).
The 2-factor model is consistent with TPB guidance in that beliefs about specific
consequences of an act are expected to be most influential in the formation of an attitude
toward that act (Ajze 1988, p. 120). The distribution of variables is neatly categorized
into favorable consequences in factor 1 and the negative consequences (except for
CRIMINAL) in factor 2.
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associated with the adoption of IAC" and three of the fo variables from the
category "reservations or concerns associated with the adoption of POC."
The factor loadings (corelation between measured variable and factor) are larger
with the first factor (FAVCONS) than with the second factor (UNFAVCONS). With
FAVCONS all fourteen of the loadings are greater than 6| and the four highest loadings
are equally split between POC and IAC regressors. Comparatively, only the three highest
loading regressors in UNFAVCONS ye loadings greater than |0.601 and they are all
regressors related to IAC adoption. To examine this further, in the next chapter required
POC and required IAC are regressed upon the factor scores (Fabrigar et al., 1999, p. 276).
Concluding Comments for this Chapter
In the first section of this chapter the responses to the individual, measured
variables were summarized in frequency tables of count and percentage as a way of
describing the results from the mailed survey. The responses to the dependent variables
of interest, required POC and required IAC, suggested the municipal finance officers
have strong support for required POC and strong opposition to required IAC.
The responses to "who" should be the principal officers attesting to the accuracy
of the financial statements revealed an interesting normative issue of whether and to what
extent financial accountability should be separated from political accountability. The
responses of the municipal finance officers seems to indicate an greement with the
Weberian-Wilsonian politics/administration dichotomy, i.e., the municipal finance
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officers do not see the elected officials as having the requisite time or knowledge to
meaningfully attest to the accuracy of the financial statements.
Favorable and unfavorable consequences specifically related to both required
POC and required IAC were measured. On the surface, the respondents appeared to
consider intangible, non-pecuniary consequences as much or more than tangible,
pecuniary consequences. A common theme which seemed to emerge was a human
resource dimension deficit in the form of an insufficient supply of individuals financially
literate about governmental financial reporting and internal controls. This problem was
partially mitigated with the adoption of POC if the principal officers attesting to the
financial statements were the city manager and municipal finance officer. However, with
adoption of IAC the respondents expressed concern with being able to secure the
necessary complement of knowledgeable, apolitical members for the committee.
The personal and organizational demographics were interesting in their variety;
however cross-tabulation between the dependent variables and the demographic variables
showed no significant association. These empirical results were consistent with the TPB
and were eliminated from further evaluation.
In the second section ofthe chapter EFA was employed to gain a further
understanding of how municipal finance officers structure their attitudes toward POC and
IAC. The variables included in the category of "general liefs about GASB 34" had low
cormunalities and were eliminated from further consideration.
The 2-factor model which emerged was consistent with the guidance provided by
TPB in that perceived favorable and unfavorable consequences specifically associated
with either POC or IAC are believed to be the most influential in the formation of
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attitudes toward adoption of POC and IAC (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen, 1988). The 2-factor
model separated the positive and negative consequences as two separate constructs in a
"simple ruct ea" The 2-factor model is interpretable and made theoretical sense,
however it is readily acknowledged that within an exploratory study of a single dataset
exteral validity veri ication through replication is not possible (Henson & Roberts,
2006, p. 400). That disclaimer notwithstanding, in the next chapter the variables of
interest, requ ed POC nd IAC, will regressed upon the factor scores (Fabrigar et aL,
1999, p. 276).
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CHAPTER V
PRELIMIARY CAUSAL FINDINGS
ELITE INTERVIEWS
Introduction
This is the second of two chapters devoted to presenting the findings from this
research. In the previous chapter the respondents indicated strong support for adopting
POC (Table 4-3) and equally strong opposition to adopting IAC (Table 4-8). Chi-square
analysis of POC and IAC against the personal and organizational characteristics found no
significant measure of association between the organizational and personal demographics
measured and the support for POC and opposition to IAC. Factor analysis suggested
elimination of the measured variables included in the domain of "general beliefs about
GASB 34" and highlighted the importance of the perceived positive and negative
consequences.
The first section of this chapter is an initial effort at gang at leat some
understanding of the relationships between the independent variables (positive and
negative consequences) and the dependent variables (POC and IAC). The analysis
begins by extending the findings from the EFA analysis from the previous chapter (Table
4-16). Instead of considering both favorable and unfavorable consequences related to
POC and IAC, the favorable and unfavorable consequences specifically associated with
POC ad specifically with IAC ae examined separately. After determining the factor
structure for POC and IAC separately, POC and IAC are regressed upon their respective
factor scores.
Next, consideration is given to exploring causal relationship between POC and
IAC and their specific favorable and unfavorable consequences. Using Ordinary Least
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Square (OLS) models POC and mAC are regressed upon their associated favorabie and
unfavorable consequences. Significant regressors are then deployed in logistic regression
models.
In the second section of this chapter the responses obtained from interviews with
"elite experts" from the gove nent accon ting-auditing field are summarized. The
interviewees included recognized academics and practitioners as well as a representative
from GASB. The interviews were conducted to gain a richer understanding of the
findings from the quantitative analysis and to address some issues surrounding the
research. Complete responses are provided in Appendi B.
Muliple Regression Analysis of Factors
In the previous chapter all ofthe non-demographic independent variables
associated with POC and IAC were analyzed utilizing EFA. The outcome of the factor
analysis was a 2-factor model. The first factor (FAVCONs) included all favorable
consequences associated with POC and IAC. The second factor (UNFAVCONS) included
all but one of the negative consequences associated with POC and IAC [CRINAL
(POC)]. The next procedural step is to examine if a similar factor structure would be
found if the consequences of POC and IAC are separately analyzed.
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Table 5-1
Consequences Specifically Related to POC
Factor Loadings > f0.401
Principal Axis Method - Varimax Rotation
Factor 1 Factor 2
Observed Variables POC FAVCONS POC UJNFAVCONS
FR-ACCT (POC) 0.840449________
FR-IMAGE (POC) 0.874393
EL-INYOLV (POC) 0.682240O________
ADM-INVOLV (POC) 0.71144'7 _
ILWISK (POC) 0.595038
DISCLOSE (POC) 0.799497 _________
BONDRATE (POC) 0.651824
KNOW (POC) 0.910070
ICKNOW (POC) 0.915748
CR1IAL (POC) 0.474786
COST>BENE (POC) 
--
_____________
Table 5-2
Consequences Specifically Related to IAC
Factor Loadings >10.401
Principal Axis Method - Varimax Rotation
Factor 1 Factor 2
Observed Variables IAC FACONS AC UNFAVCONS
FR-ACCT (IAC) 0.788554
FR-IMAGE (IAC) 0.793804
EL- OLV (IAC) ~ 0.737205 ________
ADM-INVOLV (IAC) 0.776539
LAWRISK (IAC) 0.652934
DISCLOSE (IAC) 0.787718
BONDRATE (IAC) 0.792048
ELCONTROL (IAC) 0.475452
ADMCONTROL (IAC) 0.578897]
PERSONNEL (IAC) 0.776022
EXPERT (IAC) 0.786715
COST>BENE (IAC) _0.661184
Table 5-1 and Table 5-2 are the results of two separate factor analyses. The
factors extracted from the consequences associated with POC are shown in Table 5-1 an
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the factors extracted from the consequences associated with IAC are shown in Table 5-2.
In both cases the factor structure replicates the previous findings by separating the
favorable consequences into the first factor and unfavorable consequences in the second
factor. These findings, although not as compelling as replication with a separate sample,
do provide some evidence of the reliability of the factor structure (Harlow, 2005, p. 208).
To test the relationship of the factors to POC and IAC, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regressions of POC and IAC on their respective factors is utilized.
Table 5-3
POC Regressed upon Factor Scores
Multiple Regression
Coef. s.e. Prob.
Intercept 2.6212 0.0857 0.0000
POC FAVCONS 0.6076 | 0.0818 0.0000
POC UNFAVCONS -0.1429 | 0.0809 0.0797
Model R = 0.31; F-ratio = 28.95
Table 5-4
IAC Regressed upon Factor Scores
Multiple Regression
Coef. s.e. Prob.
Intercept 3.4242 0.0823 0.0000
IAC FAVCONS 0.5512 0.0788 0.0000
JAC UJNFAVCONS -0.3798 0.0748 0.0000
Model R 0.36; F-ratio = 36.25
The findings from regressing POC and IAC on their respective factor scores are
generally in accord with the support for POC and opposition to IAC2 . The factors are
highly significant (prob. <0.01) except for the unfavorable consequences associated with
POC, which is marginally significant (prob. <0.08). The coefficient signage of the
27 By multiplying the respective regression equations by the average values of the factor scores of the
respective factors calculates values which indicate support for POC and opposition to IAC.
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factors indicates the positive influence of the favorable consequences and the negative
influence of the unfavorable consequences. The larger ratio of the coefficients
(unfavorable consequences/favorable consequences) for IAC compared to POC; plus the
increase in significance of the unfavorable consequences for IAC, suggests the
unfavorable consequences are beco mng more important in the decision to oppose IAC.
The macro level of the findings of factor analysis is generally considered to
provide "greater external validity and, as such, are more likely to replicate (Henson &
Roberts, 2006, p. 394). The findings of the regression of POC and IAC on their
respective factors is consistent with TPB, which suggests municipal finance officers
would fo favorable or unfavorable intentions to adopt POC d IAC based upon their
assessment of the specific perceived consequences (Ajzen, 1991). Next the analysis drills
down to a more micro level to explore the relationship of required POC and required IAC
to their specific individual favorable and unfavorable consequences.
Some Preliminary Causal Findings
The analysis for assessing support for POC and opposition to IAC is in two steps.
First, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was utilized with the five-point Likert
scales as dependent variable (Table 4-3 and Table 4-8). The initial domain of regressors
are the favorable and unfavorable consequences specifically sociated with POC and
IAC. Given the exploratory nature of this work, variables achieving a 0.10 level of
significance on the initial regression (Full Model) were retained to define a smaller set of
independent variables (Reduced Model) in which the traditional 0.05 level of significance
threshold was adopted. Significant regressors from the reduced model were then
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deployed in a logistic regression (Agresti, 1990) with a dichotomous dependent variable
in which "agree" and "strongly agree' were combined to form one category, and the
"disagree" and "strongly disagree" responses were combined to form the second, with
neutral responses removed from consideration. The regressors continued to use the five-
point Likert scale. It was believed this two-stage approach made sense in that the initial
regression would lead to a parsimonious final model in which the dichotomous form of
the dependent variables more closely resembles a "real world" situation favoring or
opposing adoption.
Table 5-5
Ordinary Least Squares Regression of POC on
Associated Consequences
Full Model and Reduced Model
Full Model Reduced Model
Favr Conseuence Cf. Prob, C Prob
FR-ACCT (POC) 0.01 0.14 _
FR-IMAGE (POC) 0.12 0.16 _ }
FLNVOLV (POC) 0.24 0.11 <0.05 0.32 0.11 <0.01
ADM-INVOLV OC) -0.21 0.12 <0.10 -0.06 0.11
LAWRISK (POC) 0.26 0.13 <0.05 0.37 0.11 0. 01
DISCLOSE (POC) 0.19 0.13]__
BONDRATE (POC) 0.09 0.12 ]
Unfavorable Consequences
FRKNOW 0 18 0.17
ICKNOW -0.22 0.17
CRIMINAL 0.11 0.09
COST>BENE (POC) -0.26 0.10 <0.05 -0.30 0.09 <0.01
Model R2 = 0.38; F-ratio = 6.55 Model 2= 0.32, F-ratio = 14.83
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Table 5-6
Ordinary Least Squares Regression of JAC on
Associated Consequences
Full Model and Reduced Model
Full Model Reduced Model
- E (IAC) -0.02 0.14
EL-INVOLV (tAG) 0.10 0.13
DI-INVOLV (AG) 0.10 0.14
LAWRLSK (IAC) 0.13 0.12
DISCLOSE AC) 0.26 0.13 <0.10 0.48 0.08 <0.01
BONDRATE (LAC) -0.01 0.13
Unfavorable Consequences______
ELCONTROL -0.16 0.10 <0.10 -0.11 0.08
ADCNTO 0 . 0 6 0.11_____
ON.21 .11 .1 .25 .11 <0.05
EXPERT -0.27 0.12 <0.05 ,-0.28 0.12 <0.05
COS BE (IAC) -0.35 0.11 <0.01 -0.40 0.10 <0.01
Model R= 0.44; F-ratio = 7.84 Model = 0.39, F-ratio 16.41
The significant rob. <0.05) independent variables in the reduced model (Table
5-5) for POC were EL-INVOLV(POC), LAWRISK (POC), and COST>BENE (POC). EL-INVOLV
(POC) and LAWRISK (POC) e favorable consequences and the one significant
unfavorable consequence was COST>BENE (POC). The significant independent variables
in the reduced model (Table 5-6) for IAC were DISCLOSE (IAC), PERSONNEL (IAC),
EXPERT (IAC), and COST>BENE (IAC). The single significant favorable consequence was
DISCLSOSE (IAC) and the three significant unfavorable consequences were EL-CONTROL
(IAC), PERSONNEL (IAC), d COST>BENE (IAC). The significant regressors were then
deployed in binomial logistic re ession models (Agresti, 1990). The dchotomous
dependent variables for POC and IAC were derived by combining "agree" and "strongly
agree" to form one catego d "disagree" and "strongly disagree" were combined to
form the second category. Those respondents which had a neutral response to POC
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adoption were removed from consideration, which reduced the cases considered from 132
to 110, Likewise, the reduction in cases for IAC was from 132 to 102.
Table 5-7
Logistic Regression: Strongly Agree/Agree vs. Disagree/Strongly Disagree
"In general, I believe principal officer(s) certification similar to SOX should be required
of the principal officer(s) of municipalities."
Varble Coe. s.e. Prob.
EL-INVOLV OC) 0.58 0.26 0.03
LAWRISK (POC) 1.19 0.40 0.00
COST>BENE (POC) -0.64 0.27 0.02
N 110, Pseudo Model R2= 0.61
Percent correctly classified = 80.9%
Table 5-8
Logistic Regression: Strongly Agree/Agree vs. Disagree/Strongly Disagree
"Should municipalities be required to have an independent audit committee with
responsibilities similar to the requirement of Sarbanes-Oxley?"
Variable Coe s.e. Prob.
DISCLOSE (IAC) 1.18 0.32 0.00
PERSONNEL (AC) 0.85 0.46 0.06
EXPERT (IAC) -0.92 0.43 0.03
COST>BEFNE (IAC) -1.46 0.45 0.00
N= 102, Pseudo Model R 2= 0.49
Percent correctly classified = 87.3%
Findings in Tables 5-7 and 5-8 are essentially identical to those found in our
multiple regression models, despite a reduction in cases and different functional form.
The only difference in findings is in the IAC model, in which one of the human resources
variables-finding willing IAC members (PERSONNEL)-becomes marginally significant
(p. <.06). The fact that our predictors held up well despite shrinkage of cases and change
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of dependent variable functional form speaks positively to the robustness of these
findings (Stevens, 1996).
The POC model (Table 5-7) identified EL-NVOLV (POC), LAWRISK (POC), and
COST>BENE (POC) as significant regressors which correctly classify 80.9% of the
responses to the dichotomous dependent POC variable. Likewise, the IAC model
identified DISCLOSE (IAC), PERSONNEL (IAC), EXPERT (IAC), and COST>BENE (IAC) as
significant regressors which correctly classified 87.3% of the responses to the
dichotomous IAC variable. In both models correct identification of the responses to the
dependent variables were substantially above what would be expected from mere chance.
The significant regressors in th models are those variables where significant
differences exist between those who support and those who oppose the dependent
variables. Compared to the macro understanding of the relationship between the
perceived consequences and attitudes toward POC and IAC adoption (regression of POC
and IAC on factors, Tables 5-3 and 5-4), the significant regressors identified in Tables 5-
7 and 5-8 represent a more variable specific or micro level understanding of the variables
which had value in discriminating between those who supported d those who opposed
POC and IAC in this study.
The POC model (Table 5-7) identified encouraging the municipality's elected
leadership to become more involved with the financial reporting process, which is in
agreement with the stated objectives of SOX. Both those who supported and opposed
POC did not see POC as reducing the risk of lawsuits, but those who supported POC did
believe POC adoption would provide some protection from lawsuits. Althou both
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those who supported and opposed POC perceived the cost of implementation would be
greater than the benefits, those who supported POC saw this as less of a problem.
Findings from the IAC model (Table 5-8) indicate municipal finance officers who
are opposed to IAC do not perceive IAC as encouraging a more positive attitude toward
disclosure among the administrative leadersh p and staff. They also indicated they felt it
would be difficult for municipality's to find individuals from their community who would
qualify and serve on the IAC as well as a problem in finding an "expe" to serve on the
IAC. This finding could reflect the government accountants' assessment of differences
between the private and public sector. In addition to the "sunshine laws" applicable to
public sector entities, comments received from the respondents28 indicated there might be
some concern with finding audit committee members who did not have personal or
political agendas. They also commented about finding individuals from the community
who would have sufficient knowledge of municipal accounting and auditing. Several
comrents were received about how it would be difficult, especially for smaller towns, to
have a sufficient pool of volunteers to draw from. More than 95% of those who opposed
IAC were either neutral or agreed that the cost of implementing IAC would be greater
than the benefits received. Coupled with the human resource deficit problem the findings
provide some initial insight into why municipal finance officers view implementation of
IAC as onerous".
28 6"Comments received from respondents" refers to comments received on the surveys (Appendix C).
29 It is worth noting that in the year after this study was conducted the GFOA released new guidance on
municipal audit committees which may provide some relief to the cost of implementing and staffing of an
audit committee (Gauthier, 2007a).
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Elite Pos-Survey Interviews
To further assist in interpreting the findings from the quantitative analysis and to
address some issues not directly included in the survey, the author arranged interviews
with "elite experts" from the government accounting-auditing field. The respondents
included practitioners from Florida (2) and Ohio (3), well academics (2), and a
representative from the GASB. The interviews consisted of eleven specified open-ended
questions plus an opportunity for the respondents to provide any additional comments
(see Appendix B).
The first question dealt with the finding that survey respondents believed the
"technocracy" (i.e., the city manager and finance director) should be the attesters to the
accuracy of the fmancial statements rather than the elected officials. As noted earlier,
this is consistent with the Weberian-Wilsonian politics/administration dichotomy, i.e. the
bureaucracy having the expertise needed for meaningful attestation with the elected
"dilettante" commissioners having neither the time nor knowledge needed for the task
(Bendor, Taylor, & Van Gaalen, 1985, p. 1041). This view was basically supported by
more than half of the interviewees, who often viewed elected officials as similar to a
corporate board of directors. As one interviewee stated, "most council members.... are
largely unaware of their responsibility for faithful representation... .they think the
statements ae the audit firm's." On the other hand, those who viewed mayors as the
chief executive officer felt they should also attest to the financial statements.
While there was almost universal support for CFO attestation, some might argue
that municipal CEOs, be they city managers or mayors, are not likely to have the
requisite accounting-auditing knowledge for meaningful attestation as in the private
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sector. The interviewees were asked if this deficiency provides a rationale for not
adopting SOX-like provisions or whether the municipal CEO should be required to have
some financial training. The majority of the interviewees endorsed the idea of financial
training. Some concern regarding the cost and time to tr elected officials was voiced.
There was also a suggestion that current state and auditor oversight might be sufficient.
Only one interviewee specifically stated that SOX-like requirements should not apply to
the public sector.
During the research period there was an interesting issue which occurred at a
South Florida city that inspired the following question. If a CFO is suspicious of some
financial irregularity involving a superior and the CFO is not protected under "whistle
blower" laws or does not have inspector general to report to; could the IAC be a forum
for CFO to discuss the supicion? The interviewees unanimously supported the idea that
the IAC could serve this purpose. However, they did suggest that in lieu of having an
IAC there were other alternatives.
There were two major obstacles which were related to the lack of support for
adopting an IAC: many believed there would be few individuals from the community
who would have the requisite accounting background and knowledge of municipal
operations. Others felt e JAC could be politicized as a sort of de facto shadow
government. The interviewees were asked if they believed these concerns were
legitimate.
The interviewees seemed to be from two separate camps. There were certainly
those who believed finding "technically qualified" volunteers might be difficult,
especially for smaller cities. Others believed that finding competent volunteers would be
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easier. While some believed the "shadow government" might be extreme, there were
also those who believed that an IAC could become a politicized committee. Suggested
solutions included having an audit committee composed of elected officials only or
stating very clearly the responsibilities of the audit committee. A few of the interviewees
reflected a public choice perspective by suggesting the concern with staffmg the IAC was
simply a smokescreen for those who wanted to avoid accountability and transparency.
In a related question the interviewees were asked whether the low percentage
(29.5%) of respondents reporting their municipalities had an audit committee indicated an
anti-audit bias in municipal government. The interviewees almost unanimously indicated
"anti-audit bias" was not the correct characterization. Reasons given for the low
percentage included: fear of additional oversight, lack of knowledge about the advantages
of an audit committee, and lack of the requirement. One interviewee was encouraged by
the fact that ahnost 30% of the respondents did have an audit committee.
In the sixth question of the interview the interviewees were asked to help interpret
a fmding from the survey. The survey revealed that over 90% of the respondents
indicated that financial reporting and disclosures should provide information which helps
the average citizen to better understand the role and activities of the government. In
addition, 57% agreed that municipalities owe a greater responsibility to the average
citizen to be "publicly accountable" than private ente rises owe to their investors. On
the face of it these attitudes are laudable and would seem to be coincident with the intent
of the GASB.
The puzzlement is with the interpretation of these findings. It has been
recognized that government financial statements are difficult to read and interpret (Chase
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& Phillips, 2004, p. 27) which suggests the accounting profession has not achieved its
goal of providing information which is understandable and useful (FASB Concept
Statement 2, 1980). This problem may in part be the responsibility of the accounting
profession, but it has also been recognized that Americans are lacking in financial
literacy. Recent statements from the Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke
(Berna e, 2006), as well as research from the AICPA (AICPA, 2006), suggest that most
Americans are so financially illiterate that they could not understand even the most
rudimentary of financial statements - indeed, they have difficulty figuring out if they owe
more than they own, or vice versa. Furthermore, research from the GASB itself suggests
few individual citizens pay attention to governmental financial statements in the first
place (Jones, Scott, Kimbro, & Ingram, 1985, p. 25).
The interviewees were asked to select from three alternative interpretations:
1. The survey respondents told us "what we wanted to hear" but felt otherwise.
2. The survey respondents believe the average citizen does deserve a clearer
financial statement, but overcoming financial literacy is not their responsibility.
3. The survey respondents understand that their primary audience is not the general
public, but informing other constituencies such as bond raters in a more
transparent, accurate manner will ultimately benefit the average citizen.
In general the interviewees rejected the idea that survey respondents were simply
telling us what we wanted to hear or a socially desirable response. The municipal finance
officers sincerely believe the average citizen does need to be involved and informed
about the financial affairs of their government. It w also recognized the current
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financial reporting model was difficult for the average citizen to understand. As one
respondent stated, "the vast majority of citizens and legislators never open a CAFR and
wouldn't know what to make of one if they did." Several alternatives to the financial
statement as the form of communicating to the average citizen were suggested: the
budget document, the Popular ual Financial Report 3 (PAFR), and intermediaries
such as bond raters, watchdog groups, and the media.
In question seven the interviewees were asked to address a dichotomy found in
the survey findings. A sizable majority of the survey respondents agreed that since the
implementation of GASB 34, public-sector financial reporting had become more
business-like. Yet a similar majority felt this would not benefit the average citizen and
that it was a step in the wrong direction. The interviewees were asked how they would
interpret these findings and whether they believed this was residue from the conflict with
depreciation recognition.
As might be expected, the representative from the GASB was the most defensive
of the new reporting model required under GASB 34". He felt the criticism of the new
reporting model as adopting a business-like model was unfounded and that depreciation
recognition was being found as not as difficult as originally assumed by the preparers.
Another interviewee thought GASB 34 "was a step in the right direction" and recognition
of depreciation was appropriate. Others agreed the new reporting model had at least a
similar appearance to the private-sector model. Their main concern was that the new
30 The PFR is a supplemental report recommended by GFOA, but is not a substitute for the CAFR. The
purpose of the PAFR is too provide a more user friendly format for presenting the government's financial
activities (see GFOA, 2006).
3 See also GASB (2006) Why governmental accounting and financial reporting is - and should be -
different. This white paper defends the GASB reporting model as being different from the private sector
model and discusses the recognition of infrastructure assets.
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reporting model, with its allowed differences between the basis of accounting on the
entity-wide statements versus the fund statements, was very difficult for even those
trained in accounting to understand. A finding consistent with the view that the GASB
reporting model complicates financial reporting to both the public and elected officials
(Frank & Gianakis, 2008).
In question eight the interviewees were asked if they believed that if financial
statements did become more transparent and understandable, would this weaken or
strengthen the power of the financial bureaucracy relative to elected officials or other
stakeholders such as the media or public. In general the respondents felt that whether the
financial bureaucracy was strengthened or weakened was the wrong question. Their
basic position was that if financial statements could be more transparent and
understandable this would be of benefit to both the municipality and the citizens, e.g, it
would provide "a more healthy climate and interaction between the elected and the
electors."
In questions nine and ten interviewees were asked their opinions on issues which
were not discussed in the survey instrument but nevertheless were related to this research.
In question nine, the interviewees were asked their opinioon n "who" should impose
SOX-like regulations. The interviewees overwhelming thought it should be the
responsibility of each state, however there was some recognition the federal government
might get involved through the SEC, 0MB, or/and GAO.
In question ten, the desire was to get some sense of the interviewees' attitude
toward using the internet as a way of disseminating financial and related information to
the public. The question to Ohio interviewees, which are required to post their CAFRs
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on a state sponsored website, was directed more to their experiences; for other
interviewees the question was one of their perception of possible value.
The Ohio interviewees thought having the CAFRs available on the web was a
good idea. But, they also mentioned how easy access to the CAFR did not overcome
users' lack of understading of the financial reports nor did it "kindle the interest of the
average citizen in the community's financials". The Florida practitioners felt that posting
of the budget docuent d CAFR could done at relatively low cost. The non-
practitioners thought the PAFR or something like it would be appropriate. They also
suggested that cities could take greater advantage of web technology by linking to
budgets, CAFRs, bond documents, and performance measurements.
In question eleven the interviewees were asked what a would-be promulgator of
SOX-like standards such as POC and IAC would need to consider prior to
implementation. The responses included cost-benefit analysis, specific instructions on
how to implement, which municipalities and timing, and an explanation of why the
regulations are necessary. One interviewee thought "there would need to be a huge
default or scandal - such as with Enron - that would roll these out".
In the final interview question the interviewees were asked to provide any
additional comments. Most of the interviewees provided no comment. One interviewee
discussed why encouaging municipalities to institute an internal audit pro would be
beneficial and less costly than starting with an IAC without an internal audit function.
The addition of internal audit professionals could create the necessary critical mass for
evolving to an IAC without a "top down approach to legislative improvements". Two of
the interviewees were specifically asked if providing a PAFR would be useful in
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communicating with their citizens. Both the Florida and Ohio interviewee thought
providing a PAFR would be beneficial. As the Ohio interviewee stated, "the PAFR is
key to the citizen involvement in municipal finance".
Summarizing the Elite Post-Survey Interviews
The post-survey interviews were administered to knowledgeable individuals from
academia, practice, and the GASB. The interviews consisted of open-ended questions
regarding POC and IAC iplementation issues, views of GASB 34, and other related
issues. While the interviewees provided a variety of responses to the interview questions,
the individuals interviewed seemed to share a belief in the ipo ce of financial
accounting to municipal accountability. Some additional insights gained from the
interviews include:
1. Whether the signing CEO is a mayor or city manager, the interviewees endorsed
the idea of the CEO obtaining some training to understand accounting and
auditing.
2. While there was general recognition of the potential value of an IAC, there was
also the recognition of potential problems of obtaining apolitical, qualified
members
3 There was general recognition that the CAFR does not serve the informational
needs of the average citizen and that communication to the public through
instrumentalities like the PAFR may be better.
94
4. Although having the CAFR available on the iternet was considered a good idea,
other reports such as the budget and a PAFR may be more appropriate in reaching
the public.
One underlying theme which seemed to drive the interviewees' comments was the
suggestion that reliable financial information communication to the public is a subject
which merits study not only from accounting professionals, but also from those with a
generalist public administration perspective. The inclusion of governrent accounting
and auditing in public administration curricula has been a long-standing contention
(Jones, 1991).
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION OF THE STUDY
AND
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, scandals in the financial reporting
practices in the private sector brought about widespread concern about the reliability of
financial reporting. The U.S. Congress responded to the crisis in the capital markets by
adopting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Although SOX was implemented to
improve the reliability of financial reporting in the private sector, major components of
SOX have filtered through to the public sector. Federal agencies, as well as some
nonprofit entities, have come under regulations which reflect "the spirit of SOX"
(Hawkins & Hardwick, 2005). States and local governments have not been subject to
SOX-like regulations, nevertheless there is some evidence that SOX-like practices and
requirements may be on the horizon which provided impetus to this study. The GFOA's
2006 recommendations regarding the structure and functioning of municipal audit
committees reflects the influence of SOX (Gauthier, 2007a) and recent comments by
SEC Chairman Cox reflects interest in having the authority to oversee municipal
accounting and auditing (Cox, 2007). Implicit in Chairman Cox's comments is the
suggestion that SOX-like regulations might be appropriate for the municipal sector.
The author acknowledges there are many issues which would need resolution
prior to municipalities becoming subject to SOX-like regulations, e.g., state sunshine
laws and freedom of information acts, who would author and enforce the regulations, etc.
Notwithstanding the importance of resolving these important issues this research is
designed as an exploratory effort aimed at investigating the willingness of municipal
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finance officers to accept two of the major components of SOX. The two major
components of SOX which are the subject of this study are POC and IAC. POC would
require the leadership of a municipality to have personal accountability for the
"truthfulness" of the published financial statements. The IAC requirement would
significantly change the structure and heighten the responsibilities of audit committees.
Simply stated these provisions are aied at clarifying who is accountable for the
fincial disclos es and adds an additional layer of "independent" oversight of the
municipality's accounting processes and procedures.
Both POC d IAC can be characterized as administrative innovations that have
the goal of increasing trust in the financial statements. Typically innovation research is
concerned with innovations which increase efficiency or effectiveness. A distinguishing
feature of this research is neither POC nor IAC are innovations focused on increasing
effectiveness or efficiency. Another distinguishing feature of this research is that it
focuses on innovation acceptance prior to it being a requirement rather than on
innovation adoption post-requirement. This affords the opportunity to provide an "early
read" of the perceived benefits, obstacles, and availability of resources for overcoming
the obstacles prior to required adoption. This information may assist would-be
promulgators of the regulations by providing some guidelines in forming these
innovations to fit the municipal sector.
Another distinguishing feature of this research is the focus on the acceptability of
two innovations rather than the typical focus upon the acceptability of a single
innovation. Comparing the willingness of municipal finance officers to accept two
different innovations permitted the examination of whether innovation acceptance is
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innovation specific. The findings of support for POC and opposition to IAC suggest that
municipal finance officers assess the acceptability of an innovation based upon the
specific attributes of the innovation, which is consistent with9 nnovation adoption theory
(Rogers, 2003).
The finding of support for POC and the self-reporting of early implementation of
GASB 34 and GASB 44 suggests that specific acts of accepting innovation and external
re lations requiring oversight can be found in the bureaucratic municipal environment.
These findings are consistent with the substantial literature which reports local
governments' adoption of accounting innovations, e. balanced scorec d, accrual and
entity wide reporting, and performance measurement. At the very least it brings into
question the often held view that innovation and bureaucracy e mutually exclusive
(Vigoda_Gadot, Shoham, Schwabsky, & Ruvio, 2005, p. 57; Bingham, 1976, p. 1).
With th the support of POC and opposition to IAC the respondents appeared to
consider intangible, non-pecuniary consequences as much or more than tangible benefits.
A comon theme wi ch seemed to emerge was a human resource dimension deficit in
the form of an insufficient supply of individuals financially literate about governmental
financial reporting and internal controls. This problern was partially mitigated with the
adoption of POC if the principal officers attesting to the reliability of the financial
statements were the city manager and municipal finance officer. However, this raises
some interesting legal and normative issues about "who" should be held accountable for
the relevance and reliability of the municipal financial statements. Municipalities are
political entities and the elected officials have political accountability as well as legal
responsibility for honest financial reporting. The question in the government sector is
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whether it is reasonable to expect the elected officials to have the requisite knowledge to
meaningfully attest to the accuracy of the financial reports?
When the "elite interviewees" were questioned about this issue they tended to
believe it was the responsibility of the appointed officials to account for and attest to the
expenditures and receipts of the municipality to the elected officials. Their view was that
the budget was a policy document which was the responsibility of the elected officials
with the financial statements reflecting the execution of the budget and the responsibility
of the appointed officials. This view is consistent with the well documented politics-
administration dichotomy, but fails to address the generally held view that financial
statements are the political and legal responsibility of the elected officials. Confounding
the issue of "who is responsible for what," one interviewee stated most of the elected
officials tend to incorrectly believe the accuracy of the financial statements is the
responsibility of the auditor (GASB Representative, Question I).
To partially mitigate the lack of financial knowledge the interviewees were asked
whether the municipal CEO (elected or appointed) should be required to have additional
financial training. While the majority of the interviewees endorsed this idea, as noted by
the survey respondents, the municipal CEO may be unwilling to become sufficiently
knowledgeable about financial reporting and disclosure or appropriate internal control
procedures. It appears the municipal financial officers' are acknowledging that they are
the ones most knowledgeable about the correctness of the financial statements and should
be signatory, but they would like to have additional non-financial personnel take some
responsibility for the financial statements. The implication for the financial management
component of public administration education is in broadeng the studies to include
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coverage of gover ental accounting and auditing (see Kattelus, Cheng, & Engstrom,
2005).
With the opposition to JAC adoption the huran resource deficit was expressed by
the significant concern with finding apolitical members and "experts" with the required
knowledge to meaningfully review the internal controls and act the liaison with the
external auditors. This could a very realistic view of the difficulty municipalities may
face in securing a complement of knowledgeable, apolitical members for an IAC and was
echoed by about half of the elite interviewees. The scarcity of individuals with the
requisite knowledge of governmental financial reporting, the comparative low or non-
compensation for serving, coupled with the potential legal liabilities, and the amount of
time required to properly fulfill their responsibilities 2 could very well be reasons why it
may very well be difficult to find IAC members for municipalities. However, it should
be noted that a few of the interviewees suggested the concern with staffing the IAC was
simply a smokescreen for those who wanted to avoid accountability and transparency.
Another concern with the IAC which emerged was the concern that an JAC might
be viewed by both electd and appointed of icials as having too much control over the
selection, retentio and co unication with the external auditors. This could be
interpreted as a fe of having someone from "outside the government looking inside the
gove ent"(interviewee) and/or as simply the loss of some autonomy. As the
interviewees commented the finding that only 29.5% of the respondents reported
currently having an audit committee could suggest "municipal governance hasn't really
32 In the private sector independent audit committee members have received higher compensation than
regular board members as well as indemnity agreements and liabili insurance provided by the corporation(Williams 2005). exchange, the audit committee members are putting in a deal more time (Burrowes &
Hendricks, 2005, p. 58).
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thought of the value" (interviewee) of an audit committee. This finding suggests that
prior to moving to a full blown IAC requirement that municipalities continue to be
encouraged to adopt a non-independent audit comnittee.
On the positive side finance officers did see an enhanced financial reporting
image of the community as a benefit with both the adoption of POC and IAC. Support
was also found for encouraging both elected and administrative leadership to become
more involved in the financial reporting process. These findings are consistent with the
objectives of SOX to enhance the reliability of financial disclosures through greater
involvement of non-financial personnel. However if pressed to show suppo for SOX-
like mechanisms for "improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures"
(Sarbanes-Oxley, 2003, Preamble), they have some reservations with regard to their cost
of implementation.
Survey respondents' indication that the cost of plementation would be greater
than the benefits derived was found to be significant with both POC and IAC. While this
finding would seem to be consistent with the opposition to IAC, the finding of cost
greater than benefit with the support for POC would, on the surface, appear to be
inconsistent. One possible explanation for this discrepancy may be that when
considering cost versus benefit the respondents were thinking in terms of tangible,
pecuniary benefits, rather than tot "benefits" and "costs." Another possible explanation
is that there is an "automatic" negative response to any unfunded rnandate.
That POC or IAC could reduce the risk oflawsuits did not receive support,
although with POC supporters it appeared to be less of a problem and was identified as
one ofthe significant regressors in the POC logistic model. A related finding was that a
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majority of the respondents indicated that they believed the signing principal officers
would be personally concerned with the potential for criminal penalties. The upshot is
that respondents may not view POC or IAC as serving as a prophylactic measure
protecting them from criminal penalties or lawsuits. That respondents' supported POC
adoption despite their concerns with potential lawsuits or criminal penalties suggests
these concerns were not critical to their support for POC. The municipal finance officers
may believe they have sufficient protection through sovereign munity or they may
believe that although lawsuits are always possible their probability of being found guilty
of a civil or a criminal offense was a maneable risk.
One consequence which received mild support for both POC and IAC was the
encouragement of a more positive attitude toward disclosure among the administrative
leadership and staff This was the one favorable consequence which was found
significant in the IAC logistic model. Other consequences which received mild support
with POC and basically a neutral support when related to IAC were: increasing the
importance of the CAFR as an instrument of accountability and contribution to more
favorable bond ratings. Neither of these consequences were found significant when POC
and IAC were independently regressed upon them. One explanation may be that while
these consequences may be important to the municipal finance officers they are not
perceived as favorable consequences resulting from POC or IAC adoption.
However, events which occurred subsequent to the administration of the survey
document may stiulate interest in using POC and IAC to enhance municipal bond
ratings. The bursting of the housing bubble and resulting credit-crunch which began in
2007 and continues into 2008 have negatively affected the U.S. economy, stock market,
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and bond market. ong the multiple consequences has been an impact upon municipal
bond financing. Municipal bonds rely upon bond insurance to increase their bond ratings
which serves to decrease the interest rate municipalities are required to pay.
In short, if the rating of the insurer is higher than the issuing municipality, the
bonds receive the higher rating. Unfortunately, this also works in reverse. The recent
rating downgrade of bond insurers (AMBAC and MBIA) because they also insured sub-
prime debt had the consequence of insured municipal bonds having ratings lower than the
issuing municipality. In the short-run this has resulted in either re-issuing the bonds with
a different insurer or re-issuing the bonds without insurance (Fox, 2008). In the longer
run, it is possible that municipalities with less than prime ratings may seek to improve
their ratings by adopting SOX-like practices to increase confidence in their financial
reporting.
Although the respondents' views toward the GASB 34 reporting model were not
found to influence their support for POC or their opposition to IAC, the notion of
increasing the importance and usefulness of inancial reporting were found with the
investigation of the GASB 34 reporting model. Over 90% of the respondents thought
that financial reporting should provide information which helps the average citizen to
better understand the role and activities of the municipality. And, 57% of the respondents
felt that they owed a greater responsibility for being accountable to the average citizen
than private enterprises owe to their investors. These are laudable views and are
consistent with the stated objectives of the GASB to have financial reporting play 'a
major role in fulfilling government's duty to be publicly accountable in a democratic
society" (GASB Concepts Statement 1, 1987, para. 56).
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The respondents also indicated the GASB 34 reporting model was moving
municipal financial reporting in the direction of the private sector model; which would be
consistent with the goals of the NPM movement. But, they did not believe the municipal
financial reporting model should be more like the private sector model, nor did they
believe the new model provided information that was more useful to the average citizen
for understanding the role and activities of municipalities. In short, while the finance
officers agreed with the goals of the GASB 34 reporting model, they did not believe the
new reporting model was the solution for reaching the average citizen.
That the GASB 34 reporting model is complex and difficult to read and interpret
(Chase & Phillips, 2004, p.27) was confirmed by several of the interviewees. As one
interviewee stated she had "personal experience of a CPA misinterpreting the GASB 34
statements." If CPAs are having difficulty interpreting the new reporting model it would
seem to follow that municipal finance officers' would not believe the GASB 34 reporting
model is better serving the information needs of the average citizen, Part of this could be
related to the general financial illiteracy discussed by Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben
Bernanke, as well as the AICPA (Berna e, 2006; AICPA, 2006). Another reason could
t although municipal financial statements could be of value to average citizen, their
primary audience is not the general public. As one interviewee stated, "If they [average
citizens] do not understand, they will put trust in those they t does understand. That
information could come from bond holders, the media, elected officials, or government
auditors."
A less sanguine interpretation would be that if the general public is provided with
financial statements that are more transparent and understandable this eh anced
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-information symmetry" may threaten the existmg mrormation advatage of the nnancial
bureaucracy. When the interviewees were asked to weigh in on this, their comments
indicate that providing tranparent and understandable fmancial inforrnation to the
general public was of greater value than any loss to the information advantage of the
bureaucracy or elected officials. This suggests that municipal finance officers possess a
"publicness" mindset which recognizes the value of having an informed citizenry.
Concluding Remarks
The fidings of this research are consistent with the previously stated hypotheses.
First, tht intentions to favor or oppose adoption of POC and IAC result from the
municipal finance officer's evaluation of the associated perceived attributes. Second,
general beliefs about the GASB 34 reporting model would not be influential to the
formation of the municipal finance officer's intention to accept or oppose POC and JAC.
In addition there w no sign ict measure of sociation found between the support for
POC and opposition to IAC with prior behavior, personal demographics of the
respondents, or the org ational demographics of the municipalities. In short, the
findings suggest the acceptance of POC or IAC are more associated with behavioral
beliefs than with the traditional sociological variables so often used in public
administration studies (see Frank, Christian, & Scutelnicu, forthcoming).
This study is believed to be the first study to examine the willingness of
municipalities to accept or oppose POC and IAC. The findings of this study are offered
as an "early read" of the willingness of municipal ce officers to accept POC and
oppose IAC. It provides some preliminary indication of some perceived benefits and
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obstacles associated with both POC and IAC, The coefficient of correlation (R) found
between POC and its associated consequences (.38) and between IAC and its associated
consequences (.44) compare favorably to other studies utilizing TPB (Sutton, 1998).
Nonetheless there are limitations to the findings of this study.
The primary research instrurent of this study was a mailed survey instrument
sent to all municipalities in Florida 3 and Ohio with a population of 10,000 or greater.
The responses showed no response bias by state or city size. On the other hand, although
the surveys were sent to a great lake state and a southern state which may reflect the
views of municipalities in these regions, the findings are limited to municipalities located
in Florida and Ohio. Another limitation is that while the response rate of 42.2%
compares favorable to similar rese c their remains a concern with non-response bias.
This study only touched the surface of what could be known about the willingness
of municipalities to accept administrative innovations. The combination of innovation
acceptance with the theory of planned behavior was found to be a useful framework for
studying the relationship between willingness to accept an innovation and determinants
of that willingness. Use of this framework could be of value in studying innovation
acceptance in multiple domains including public administration, public policy, and
gove rnent accounting policy. Recommendations for future research would include
replication of the study in states other than Ohio and Florida. Another approach for
future research would be focus on cities of a certain size. For example, in this research
although there was no response bias, there were only nine respondents which were from
3 Two municipalities in Florida which would otherwise qualify were eliminated from the targeted
population because they contracted out the operation of their finance departments.
106
cities with populations of 100,000 or greater. Nevertheless, the findings suggested the
perceived need for "SOX-like" regulations might be greatest with larger communities.
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Example of Interview Request
Dear Dr. <Last Name>,
Last year I mailed a survey to municipal finance officers in Ohio and Florida (populations
greater than 10,000) regarding their attitude about whether two of the major provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley should be adopted by municipalities. I am happy to report the survey
had a 42.2% response rate and I have been able to obtain some valuable insight.
(Attached is a very brief summary which includes some demographic information you
may find interesting.)
I am in the process of writing up the results from the survey and, as I am sure you can
imagine, many times there are alternative interpretations. I have been able to interview
practitioners, but I would like to have the prospective from leading researchers like you.
Interviewing you is especially important to me because I am personally aware of your
distinguished contribution to the municipal accounting profession. In addition, my Major
Professor, Dr. Howard Frank, suggested I contact you.
If you agree to be interviewed, I have developed a process that hopefully will make it
very convenient for you. All you need to do is go to the following link:
http://chua2.fiu.edu/SocialWork/doug6/login.asp
When you arrive at the login you will be asked for:
Login: <interviewer's email address>
Password: Please enter a password of your choosing.
Only you and I will have access to your responses. Your responses will be held in the
strictest confidence and will never be disclosed as your responses.
You can access the web survey multiple times (using your login and password) which
allows you to complete the survey as your time permits. When you have completed the
survey, please send me an email so I know. After I know you have completed the survey
I will then email you to confirm and if necessary arrange a time to call to discuss your
responses.
Please advise whether you would agree to be interviewed. I hope you will.
Thanks,
Douglas R. Fink
954-592-0487
cc: Dr. Howard Frank, Major Professor
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Who is considered as the chief administrative officer of the city?
* City Manager - 61%
* Mayor -31%
* Other - 8%
Who appoints or elects your city's chief financial officer?
* Appointed by city manager -48%
* Appointed by City Council/Mayor - 34%
* Elected - 18%
Who does the chief financial officer directly report to?
* The citizens (when elected) - 18%
* The city council/mayor - 27%
* City manager - 48%
* Assistant city manager - 3%
* Other - 4%
Percentage of chief financial officers who are CPAs? - 50% (Only 1 respondent was
both a CPA and CMA. This was the only CMA.)
Percentage ofrespondents with a masters degree or higher. - 35%
The survey results were obtained in the summer of 2005. At that time, with regard to
implementing GASB 34, the respondents indicated the following:
My municipality was an early implementer of GASB 3 2 %
My municipality implemented GASB 3 in the year prescribed 65.9%
My muncipality was a late implementer of GASB 34 3.0%
My mu-I ~cpiyhs not yet produced aCFfoo gGABguidance 1.%
Again, during the summer of 2005, the respondents indicated their implementation of
GASB 44 (Economic Condition Reporting: The Statistical Section) as follows:
My municipalit has alread implemented GASB 44 17%
My municipality will be implementing GASB as guided 51%
My nici ality has not made a decision on the date of implementin GASB 44 33%
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Questions for Interviews
Number 1
Most of our respondents believed the "technocracy," (i.e., the city manager and finance
director/CFO) should be attesters to financial statements. At the same time, most felt the
mayor and/or council should not. From the perspective of familiarity with accounting
technology and internal control, this is understandable. However, from a normative
standpoint, does it seem fitting that those who appropriate funds should not also be the
same as those who attest to the truthfulness of the municipal financial statements?
Number 2
The average mayor or city manager may not have the accounting-auditing expertise of
their private sector co te s such as CEO or COO. Some might argue that this
differential provides rationale for not adopting SOX-like provisions. Other might say
that the public sector could emulate the private and remediate these deficiencies through
training. Which alternative do you prefer and why?
Number 3
A municipal CFO may perceive him or herself as independent. But the reality of
municipal hierarchy means they are subordinate to any of several actors in the system. If
the CFO were to be suspicious that some irregularity involving a superior might need to
be addressed, to whom might they turn? In answering this question, you should probably
assume that only a handful of large municipalities would have an inspector general or
similar office, and many CFO's may not be covered by laws that protect "whistle
blowers." Could an independent audit committee serve this function?
Number 4
Many of our respondent expressed deep reservations about implementation of JAC.
Their opposition was twofold: many believed that there would be few available to serve
who had the requisite accounting background and knowledge of municipal operations.
Others felt it could become politicized as a sort of de facto shadow government. Do you
believe these concerns are legitimate? If so, why?
Number 5
Only 29.5% of our respondents indicated their respective cities had audit committees?
Do you feel this indicates an anti-audit bias in municipal governance?
132
Number 6
Over 90% of o respondents felt it was critically important for financial statements to
help citizens better understand their governments. And, 57% agreed that municipalities
owe a greater responsibility to the average citizen to be "publicly accon table" than
private enterprises owe to their investors.
On the face of it, these attitudes are laudable. But recent statements from our Federal
Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, as well as research from the AICPA, suggest that most
Americans are so financially illiterate t t they could not understand even the most
rudimentary of financial statements-indeed, they av difficulty figuring out if they owe
more than they own, or vice versa. Furthermore, research from the GASB itself suggests
few citizens pay attention to government financial statements in the first place.
With that said, one could explain our findings in any of three ways:
a) Our respondents told us "what they think we wanted to hear" but felt otherwise;
b) Our respondents believe that the average citizen does deserve a clearer financial
statement, but overcoming citizen financial illiteracy is not their responsibility.
c) Our respondents understand that their primary audience is not the general public,
but informing other constituencies such as bond raters in a more transparent,
accurate manner will ultimately benefit the average citizen.
Which of these interpretations makes the most sense to you and why?
Number 7
One of the great contradictions of our finding is as follows. A sizable majority of our
respondents agreed that since the implementation GASB 34, public sector financial
reporting is becoming more private sector-like. Yet a similar majority felt this would not
nefit the average citizen d that it was a step in the wrong direction?
How do you interpret this dichotomy? Do you feel this is in part residue over the conflict
regarding asset depreciation and its recording?
Number 8
If the financial statements become more transparent and understandable to the public, do
you think this would weaken or strengthen the power of the financial bureaucracy relative
to elected officials or other stakeholders such as the media or public?
Number 9
Assuming SOX-like provisions were adopted in local governments, "who" should impose
them? It would seem the choice is either the individual states or a federal agency such as
the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Please comment.
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Number 10 rLwIDA
The advent of the internet makes the widespread dissemination of a government annual
financial report to all citizens who request it quite simple and inexpensive. If local
governments were required to undertake this, what would be the "shape and form" of this
document? Would it be comprised primarily of financials, per a CAFR? Would it
combine financials with SEA's (the direction taken by federal agencies)? Would it be
required to show comparisons relative to peers or national standards?
Number 10 OHIO
The advent of the internet makes the widespread dissemination of a government annual
financial report to all citizens who request it quite simple and inexpensive. In this regard,Ohio is one of the leading states in requiring that CAFRs be available at one central
location. Do you think this has been of value? For example, does it seem that your
citizens are using this website to obtain a copy of your CAFR? Has it lowered your cost
of printing CAFRs for public dissemination? On the other hand, has having the CAFR so
reaily available created some unintended consequences?
Number 11
Based on your knowledge and experience in the field, what do you think a would-be
promulgator of SOX-like standards such as POC and IAC would need to consider prior to
implementation, and why?
Number 12
Please provide any additional comments.
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Academic
Following the model from the corporate environment, the management must attest to the
financial statements. This includes several board of director positions.
Practitioner 
- Large City, Florida
I believe the chief executive should be responsible for attesting to the financial statements
accuracy. In the case of a strong Mayor form of government 
- this is the Mayor. (This is
case with the City of XXXXX) In reality - the elected official is going to sign the attest
statement with a firm reliance on the finance officials advise and consent.
GASB Representative
In my opinion, when one says that the financial report is the representation of
management, that means the elected officials who are ultimately responsible for the
government and accountable to the citizens. The CFO or city manager work for the
elected officials, be they council members or a mayor. Of course, most council members
do not realize this. They do not realize that they financial statements are theirs; instead,
they think the atements are the audit firm's. They are largely unaware of their
responsibility for faithful representation.
Academic
I believe that the city's CEO (e.g., mayor) should also certify the financial statements.
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Question 2
The average mayor or city manager may not have the accounting-auditing expertise of
their private sector counterparts such as CEO or COO. Some might argue that this
differenti l provides rationale for not adopting SOX-like provisions. Other might say
that the public sector could emulate the private and remediate these deficiencies through
training. Which alternative do you prefer and why?
Practitioner - Large City, Florida
I prefer the latter. The Manager is responsible for organization internal controls and for
establishing the correct and proper control environment. It is the Manager's
responsibility to hire the right person to be the CFO. In most governments, the Council
has no authority to direct employees or evaluate employees reporting to the City
Manager. Therefore, it follows that the only person the Council can evaluate is the City
Manager. The buck stops with the City Manager. If the Manager does not know about
the financial affairs of the government, he/she has a responsibility to obtain training,
make sure the external auditors are extremely qualified and familiar with government
accounting and auditing, and/or hire a qualified internal auditor.
The Manager should not be able to defer any financial reporting deficiency to the CFO.
It is the Manager's job to manage and to assemble a team that understands financial
accounting and internal control. Internal control is management's responsibility, not only
the CFO.
Practitioner - Medium City, Ohio
I prefer to see much more training for mayors in the financial arena. Perhaps they can get
a certification that would including fiscal and other training.
Practitioner - Medium City, Ohio
There are more differences in the private/public comparison greater than the rmayor or
city manager not having accounting-auditing experience (which is also true). There is no
reason to enhance financial statements to appear more profitable or any profit motive. In
Ohio, the State has oversight responsibilities for audits supplemented by county duties to
oversee appropriations.
Where there are portions of SOX such as audit committees that may enhance the public
sector process, in general the public sector should not adopt SOX.
Practitioner - Very Small City, Ohio
How about the part-time Mayor of a small city that has a full-time Finance Department
which is run by a CPA and the Mayor is say, a butcher by trade and all he wants to do is
selfless public service for his residents? Would his signature, if required, have any
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meanig and would it make sense to hold him accountable for something beyond his field
of expertise? The same would apply to Township Trustees who are newly elected and
have no real background in Government Finance except the knowledge that taxes make
the township go round.
Again, it is understandable to have some accountabilit by posing and enforcing
policies such as establishment of Audit Committees and possibly even expanding the
scope of the annual audit contract to concentrate on various areas of the government
which may be prone to fraud.
Academic
I support the strategy of remedying the deficiencies through training. It is important that
the mayor or city manager and elected board members be accountable for the financial
status of the community they represent. If they are not as knowledgeable as they should
be, we will not be able to advance increased accounting-auditing assurances.
Practitioner - Large City, Florida
I think a hybrid approach is necessary. The chief executive of the government should be
better informed regarding control issues and risks, but not necessarily to the point of
advanced understanding and knowledge. If the chief executive is elected, the time needed
to fully train them in these areas will be very limited. The finance professional should be
the best informed and the chief executive should rely on this individual to have the
requisite financial accounting experience. In addition, the independent auditor's role is
vital.
GASB Representative
The chief executive of a government does not have to be an accountant in order to
understand the implications of accounting and financial reporting. By the same token,
they don't have to be social workers in order to understand their social services, or a
former police officer to understand public safety. They higher people with the proper
credentials and experience. Yet, it is still incumbent upon the chief executive, as the
person ultimately responsible for the government and accountable to the citizenry, to be
generally knowledgeable and aware. Some elected officials, executive and legislative
both, are shockingly ill-informed about accounting. In summary, they don't have to be
CPAs, but they should have a basic layperson's knowledge that allows them to oversee
what is being done and take ultimately responsibility for it.
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Question 03
A municipal CEO may perceive him or herself as independent. But the reality of
municipal hierarchy means they are subordinate to any of several actors in the system. If
the CFO were to be suspicious that some irregularity involving a superior might need to
be adr essed, to whom might they tur In swering this question, you should probably
assume that only a handful of large municipalities would have an inspector general or
similar office, and many CFO's may not be covered by laws that protect "whistle
blowers." Could an independent audit committee serve this function?
Practitioner - Large City, Florida
I would have two suggestions. First, an independent audit committee would be a good
place to discuss the issue. The audit committee could provide suggestions, ask questions,
and provide direction. However, they have no enforcement or criminal investigative
authority. The audit committee would be a good sounding board for direction. The
second suggestion would be the City Attorney (legal council), and third, the government's
external auditors. If this appears to be a criminal act, the person would be wise to speak
to the State Attorney in the judicial circuit. The person would also be wise to speak to
their own personal attorney first.
Practitioner - Medium City, Ohio
It could, but another elected official such as President of Council, etc. could also serve in
that role.
Practitioner - Medium City, Ohio
Yes an audit committee could serve this purpose. However, good government and current
auditors should insist on adopting a whistle blower policy
Practitioner - Very Small City, Ohio
An independent audit committee would definitely serve this purpose if used in
accordance with its full potential and also as long as it stays 'independent'. If, for
example, the audit committee is appointed by the Mayor because of his personal
relationship with the members appointed it may or may not achieve the purpose
depending on how close the relationship is. On the other hand, if the audit committee in
keeping with their responsibility could be held liable for malfeasance, misfeasance or
maybe even gross misconduct maybe the relationships would not hamper the efficient
fumnctioning.
The CFO probably would have other options in addition to involving the Audit
Committee. These would include, approaching the State Auditor or perhaps the County
Prosecutor anonymously, if need be.
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The CFO could turn to the elected officials and/or outside legal counsel, but this may be
difficult because of the vested interest and relationships. An independent audit
committee might be very useful to avoid such conflicts in these situations.
Practitioner - Large City, Florida
Absolutely. The independent audit committees the perfect solution to this case. I would
also argue that there should be an independent audit function in any good size
municipality as the cost of this area is well covered by the savings in audit findings and
possible decrease in extensive external audit testing.
GASB Representative
As I understand the function of an independent audit committee, that is not really theirfunction. However, it might be a possible avenue for the CFO, if it can be done discreetly
and privately. Alternative, there is typically someone at the state level with oversight
responsibility for local governments. That person or office might be the appropriate
venue for raising potential irregularities.
Academic
I favor an audit committee for this purpose.
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Question 04
Many of our respondent expressed deep reservations about implementation of IAC.
Their opposition was twofold: many believed that there would be few available to serve
who had the requisite accounting background and knowledge of municipal operations.
Others felt it could become politicized as a sort of de facto shadow government. Do you
believe these concerns are legitimate? If so, why?
Practitioner - Large City, Florida
The comments have no validity at all. An audit committee is an excellent idea. I have
worked with one for seven years and cannot imagine not having an audit committee. It
provides credibility, provides oversight over the auditor, is involved in the selection of
the external auditor, and accepts the CAFR. It promotes accountability. Those that are
not in favor of an independent audit committee are not secure in themselves and appear
they do not want to be held accountable.
Practitioner - Medium City, Ohio
Yes, I would be concerned - it may undermine the process - I think there is an alternative
- an audit committe of the legislative body plus the ability to hire "experts" to help if they
did not have knowledge themselves.
Practitioner - Medium City, Ohio
Yes, unfortunately this is true.
Our government created an IAC. Instead of creating it to enhance the independent
oversight it became a political issue. The politicians didn't understand how it was to be
used and solicited people to serve who wanted to do things such as review compensation
of employees and critique economic development tools etc. Instead of asking for
participants with some auditing/accounting knowledge it was stated publicly that "anyone
with any background or training" could serve.
Practitioner - Very Small City, Ohio
To a certain extent they are legitimate. In a highly political environment it is feasible that
the IAC could be used as a baton by either side, the current office holders or the potential
ones. I do not however believe that it would be hard to find a couple of members in the
community who would be willing and able to serve. Municipal operations is an acquired
knowledge and can be taught without too many pitfalls. The IAC may not have the exact
accounting background but is that a real requirement? The majority of the functions that
include understanding and maybe providing input on internal policies and procedures and
acting as a liason between the external auditors and the management could be
accomplished. Governments have watch dogs and considering almost everything is
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public record it would be advisable to establish an IAC and a good way to dissuade the
formation of a de facto shadow government.
Academic
Yes, I believe the concerns are legitimate. Both concerns could be addressed with a very
clear charge to the independent audit committee. This would need to be followed up with
continuing discussions about the purpose and charge for such a committee.
Practitioner - Lare Cit, Florida
The "shadow government" argument is quite extreme, in my opinion. My experience with
audit committees in government is that the individuals on the committees recognize their
role as advisors and not substitutes for the elected officials. Some understanding of the
extent of their role is needed as most professionals tend to advise more and not less.
When an internal audit function is present, some accountability should align with the
auditor with advise received from the audit committee.
Regarding the lack of expe ise, this is indeed a problem and would be more of a problem
in smaller governments. This can be counter-acted by allowing both residents and
business professionals who have offices in the municipality. Also, university professors
may be available.
GASB Representative
I can see why they would feel that way. There is an general resistance to transparency
and accountability, such that any reform, including an IAC, would be viewed
suspiciously. But IACs do not usually have any "powers." They can shed light on an
issue, but don't have the authority to implement changes, at least as far as I understand
them. Regarding the issue of finding qualified people to serve, I disagree. I believe it is
easier than they think.
Academic
In most cities I would think that there are local CPAs, bankers, educators, and others who
could serve on such a committee. I do not see this as a shadow government.
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Question O5
Only 29.5% of our respondents indicated their respective cities had audit committees?
Do you feel this indicates an anti-audit bias in municipal governance?
Practitioner - Large City, Florida
It demonstrates an anti-accountability bias. It demonstrates they do not want to have
someone from outside the government looking inside the government. A qualified audit
committee can be a positive influence over the organizations system of internal control.
It could be seen as a threat if the City internal auditor reports to the City Manager. The
Manager may not feel comfortable with knowledgeable parties being that close to
government.
Practitioner - Medium City, Ohio
No. It has just not been commonly used.
Practitioner - Medium City, Ohio
NO, I think it shows that municipal governance hasn't really thought of the value and that
oversight needs are being met in other ways.
Practitioner - Very Small City, Ohio
No one wants to be audited. Especially Finance Directors! We know what we are doing.
Right? Wrong! There are communities that dread the annual audits only because they
have skated along for another year and have not acted on any of the citations or
recommendations made by auditors in the previous year. So maybe there is some truth to
the anti-audit bias but only from the ones that did not comply. On the other hand it is the
most effective tool in proving their performance. So other than the fact that auditors do
take up a lot of time and efforts, I believe most city officials accept it as a necessary tool
to prove the efficacy of their policies and processes. I believe that the low percentage of
communities that have audit committees indicates that since it is a recommendation and
not a requirement it is another layer of meetings and bureaucracy that can be avoided.
Academic
No, I believe it suggests that the finance committee and/or the full board takes on this
role
Practitioner - Large City, Florida
Not at all. think it indicates a need for more information about the benefits of an internal
audit function and an audit committee getting in front of elected officials.
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GASB Representative
No. I just think that in a lot of governments, little attention is paid to the audit. It's just
something they have to do, usually because the state says so. I would not be surprised to
learn that many city officials don't know what one is or what its potential benefits are.
They are becoming better known, though. It would be interesting to know what that
number would have been 10 years ago.
Academic
Given there is not a requirement, I thought nearly 30% was encouraging.
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Question 06
Over 90% of our respondents felt it was critically important for financial statements to
help citizens better understand their governments. And, 57% agreed that municipalities
owe a greater responsibility to the average citizen to be "publicly accountable" than
private enterprises owe to their investors.
On the face of it, these attitudes are laudable. But recent statements from our Federal
Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, as well as research from the AICPA, suggest that most
Americans are so fi cially illiterate that they could not understand even the most
rudimentary of cial atement indeed, they have difficulty figuring out if they owe
more than they own, or vice versa. F he ore, rese ch from the GASB itself suggests
few citizens pay attention to government financial statements in the first place.
With that said, one could explain our findings in any of three ways:
d) Our respondents told us "what they think we wanted to hear" but felt otherwise;
e) Our respondents believe that the average citizen does deserve a clearer financial
statement, but overcomg citizen financial illiteracy is not their responsibility.
f) Our respondents understand that their primary audience is not the general public,
but informing other constituencies such as bond raters in a more transparent,
accurate manner will ultimately benefit the average citizen.
Which of these interpretations makes the most sense to you and why?
Practitioner - Large City, Florida
If I had to choose, I would choose item C. Citizens need to be involved and informed
about the financial affairs of their government. The more they are told the more they can
hold elected officials accountable. If they do not understand, they will put trust in those
they think does understand. That information could come for bond holders, the media,
elected officials, or government auditors. Whether they use them or understand financial
statements, government has a respo nsibility to report and be held coutable. Citizens
have a responsibility to vote and to then hold those they vote for accountable.
Practitioner - Medium City, Ohio
Our respondents elieve tht the average citizen does deserve a clearer financial
statement, but overcoming citizen financial illiteracy is not their responsibility, it is ours -
prepare financial reports that they can read - such as the popular financial report - is an
overview, but keeps them informed.
Practitioner - Medium City, Ohio
I think respondents believe the average citizen does deserve a clearer financial statement
but GASB 34 statements are not going to provide that. Most local governments rely on a
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budget document that is easier to explain.
Also, PAFRs are being used to try to explain government finances.
Like most local government communications, there is apathy in the public.
Practitioner - Very Small City, Ohio
I am with the 90% crowd. 'B' does sound like the one I would pick since going the extra
step of ing the statements more understandable for the lay person is one thing but
then to conduct classes to educate people in reading these statements would be another.
Its like the thing about taking the horse to the water....
Academic
c. the average citizen relies on others to monitor state and local governments -- e.g., the
bond raters, watchdog groups, and the media.
Practitioner - Large City, Florida
I would say either b or c.
The finance officials I encounter understand that the financial statements are meant to
serve many readers and that the general public is lower on the list than bond raters,
elected officials, and the audit community.
The effort necessary to revise the current financial model to a more user friendly end
product is immense and could cost countless hours and dollars. It seems that the political
will is not there for such an uphill battle and the public isn't clamoring for any change.
GASB Representative
It is probably a combination of the three. A lot of governments do make an attempt to
communicate basic information in a meaningful way to the general public. What may be
necessary is not only to provide the information, but also to provide some explanation
that helps the citizen to make sense of what s/he is seeing. The issue of who financial
statements are intended to serve is a longstanding conundrum. Although conceptually
financial reporting standards include citizens and their representatives as a key group
intended to be served by financial statements, the vast majority of citizens and legislators
never open a CAFR and wouldn't know what to make of one if they did, However, it is
equally true that many citizens and legislators are end users of financial statement
information without realizing it. They receive the information from intermediaries who
are the direct users of the financial statements. These intermediaries take the financial
statement information, process it, and then communicate it to others in a form that is
meaningful. Intermediaries would include city council and state legislative staff, citizen
and taxpayer groups, and analysts at mutual funds, just to name a few.
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cademic
') That is what I have heard for years.
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Question 07
One of the great contradictions of our finding is as follows. A sizable majority of our
respondents agreed that since the implementation GASB 34, public sector financial
reporting is becoming more private sector-like. Yet a similar majority felt this would not
benefit the average citizen and that it was a step in the wrong direction?
How do you interpret this dichotomy? Do you feel this is in part residue over the conflict
regarding asset depreciation and its recording?
Practitioner - Large City, Florida
GASB 34 was a step in the right direction. It focuses on interperiod equity ann
intergenerational responsibility. The difficulty in terms of the public is that GASB 34
presents information two ways - fund basis and entity wide. It appears to the average
taxpayer as keeping two sets of books - thereby adding to their confusion.
Depreciation is recognized in the private sector and has always been recognized in
enterprise and internal service funds. It recognizes the using up of an asset and even in
governmental type funds it is difficult to argue against.
Practitioner - Medium City, Ohio
a) It is true, our financial statements look more private like, but they are not being used
that way. In addition, having three (in Ohio we do) different basis of accounting in the
same financial statements makes confusion for everyone.
b) Somewhat, - especially when a reader sees this large value as an asset (infrastucture) -
but that is only a small part of it. The biggest problem is the different basis - they look at
the "balance sheet" and do not realize it is different from the statement of net assets.
I have personal experience of a CPA misinterpreting the GASB 34 statements, including
comparing expenses from the entity-wide to the total budget (cash basis) - and reaching
the conclusion that we are horrible budgeters.
Practitioner - Medium City, Ohio
I think both of those things are true. However, GASB 34 statements are not easily
readable. I've had private sector accountants ask for interpretations. Those of us using
GASB 34 reporting have accepted depreciation. The statements are still different from
private sector and questions always arise from layman as to what they mean.
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average citizen? If a citizen with an interest and a willingness to read the MD&A can't ge
something meaningful out of it, then perhaps the MD&A is not well written. Some
finance officers say that citizens can't understand their financial report, but they don't do
anything to make it more understandable, accessible, and readable. There is nothing in
GAAP that prevents governments from aking their financial reports easier to use and
understand.
Academic
a) In part, the attitude is resistance to change
b) probably so.
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Question 08
If the financial statements become more transparent and understandable to the public, do
you think this would weaken or strengthen the power of the financial bureaucracy relative
to elected officials or other stakeholders such as the media or public?
Practitioner - Large City, Florida
Transparency will increase stewardship and accountability. It will strengthen other
stakeholders knowledge and increase their expectations.
Practitioner - Medium City, Ohio
Theoretically, it should weaken the power of the financial bureaucracy as more people
would understand the processes and thus the results.
However, when the media is involved, all is unknown....
Practitioner - Medium City, Ohio
I would hope it would weaken it but after this election season, I hope little hope that the
public would take the time to educate itself in order not to have to rely on the messages
given from politicians.
Practitioner - Very Small City, Ohio
Making the financial statements more understandable should be the goal and whether it
weakens or strengthens the power of the financial bureacracy is not something that
should be a concern. Everything that is expensed by using tax dollars should be an open
record and hopefully justifiable if and when questioned either by the media or the public.
This will ultimately diminish the jaundiced eye of the general public towards the
bureaucracy and provide for a more healthy climate and interaction between the elected
and the electors. (Which world am I living in?)
Academic
No.
Practitioner - Large City, Florida
It can only strengthen the financial bureaucracy is the public is engaged in the process
and understands its results.
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GASB Representative
I don't understand the question. It seems like you're alluding to the power of information-
-whoever possesses the information, holds the power. When financial statements become
more transparent and understandable, then the public gets decision-useful information it
didn't have before, allowing them to make better informed decisions. You could interpret
that as empowering them. If you believe that relinquishing control over information
means the finance officer is "weakened," then I guess the assertion is correct. But one
could also view transparency and understandability as improving the finance officer's
ability to demonstrate proper stewardship and accountability--they are tools for proving
to the public that you have done a good job. The GASB is sometimes accused of trying to
set policy through its standards. Some argued that 34 was an attempt to make
governments invest more in infrastructure. Others have claimed that 43 and 45 were
attempts to force governments to fund their retiree health insurance. That's just silly. If a
standard provides the public new information it didn't have before, and as a result of
having this new information the public communicates different priorities to the
government officials, how is this GASB setting policy? It is more accurate to say, I think,
that those officials got away with doing something the public didn't want it to do, because
the public didn't know what was going on until the new standards required that
information be reported.
Academic
Reducing information asymmetry is a good thing for the public and other stakeholders.
The question is how to do so, GASB 34 probably is not the answer.
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Queston 09
Assuming SOX-like provisions were adopted in local governments, "who" should impose
them? It would seem the choice is either the individual states or a federal agency such as
the Government Accountability 0fice (GAO). Please comment.
Practitioner - Large City, Florida
I do not think the GAO can impose accounting requirements. GAO imposes auditing
requirements. OMB Circular A-123 (Sarbanes-Oxley equivalent at the federal level) is an
OMB action - not GAO. This could be imposed through changes to 0MB Circualr A-
133 for state and local governments receiving federal funds or it could be required by
individual state governments. It is easier to mandate at the federal level for federal
agencies - one federal government. It will much harder to require at the State level as
there are 50 state governments with 90,000 local governments providing them input. For
OMB to require this through 0MB Circular A-133 would result in an outcry from the
states. I do not see this coming to the states in the near future.
Practitioner- Medium City, Ohio
It would probably have to come from the GAO or some other body (more likely the SEC
relating to municipal bond issuers)
Practitioner - Medium City, Ohio
I think the State needs to oversee and determine the process within the State.
Practitioner - Very Small City, Ohio
The imposer could be the State or the Federal Govt. Of course, the closer the imposer is
to the local government in level the better it is for communication and further action. The
question is who will enforce it? If the State Auditor was given the responsibility of being
the enforcer, then it makes sense to have the imposing authority as close in level to the
State. It would complicate and delay action and reporting if the Federal Govt were the
imposer.
Academic
State governments should impose SOX-like provisions for small governments. Those
who fall under the single audit act could have provisions imposed by the federal
government.
Practitioner - Large City, Florida
I ti the cuent Comptroller General has the political will to t e on such a project, but
this is not a guaranteed in future appointees. Legislation is needed to ensue° position of
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the provisions and I support this could be effective from either federal or state.
GASB Representative
Not sure GAO could, unless it was through the single audit requirements. I suppose it
would be done on a state-by-state basis. Another option, that most governments probablywould not find palatable, would be the SEC, though that would apply only to
governments in the public credit markets.
Academic
State.
154
Question 1 noria
The advent of the internet makes the widespread dissemination of a government annual
financial report to all citizens who request it quite simple and inexpensive. If local
governments were required to undertake this, what would be the "shape and form" of this
document? Would it be comprised primarily of fmancials, per a CAFR? Would it
combine financials with SEA's (the direction taken by federal agencies)? Would it be
required to show comparisons relative to peers or national standards?
Practitioner - Large City, Florida
The Office has a web-site that includes information about the city auditor, office, audit
committee, and questions and answers to most frequently asked questions. Importantly,
every audit we issue is on our web site in its entirety to include a summary.
Academic
A "popular report" which includes simplified financials and SEA data would be most
useful with a link to a full set of financial statements and footnotes.
Practitioner - Large City, Florida
Each of these ideas have their own unique issues and concerns. The simplest answer is to
simply post the Budget document and CAFR, which does not require any additional cost.
The other two options are larger and more expensive undertakings.
GASB Representative
All very good questions. Many governments that prepare audited financial statements put
them on their websites in pdf form. Few, if any, take advantage of the functionality of the
Internet. There is no drill-down capacity, no linkage to other information, such as
performance measures, bond documents, budgets, etc. If an XBRL taxonomy is ever
developed for governments, it would be a boon to financial reporting, but I think it's a
long way off. That is where comparability is going to come from. If the intention is to
further the indoctrination of citizens, then the CAFR as a whole would probably not be
the right document. Rather, it would be one of many documents and databases from
which information would be drawn. There should probably be a central portal that allows
the user to bring together information from disparate sources within and without the
government.
Academic
There should be some flexibility but I believe that SEA and financial information is very
useful as would be comparisons to cities of similar size and other features.
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Question 10 Ohio
The advent of the internet makes the widespread dissemination of a government annual
financial report to all citizens who request it quite simple and inexpensive. In this regard,
Ohio is one of the leading states in requiring that CAFRs be available at one central
location. Do you think this has been of value? For example, does it seem that your
citizens are using this website to obtain a copy of your CAFR? Has it lowered your cost
of printing CAFRs for public dissemination? On the other hand, has having the CAFR so
readily available created some unintended consequences?
Practitioner 
- Medium City, Ohio
Yes, it has helped 
- we link to the state auditors website for the CAFR and audit - and thishelps show our openness and assurance (audit). And yes, we had unintended
consequences 
- a local CPA got a copy of the CAFR and turned it
into a political issue saying we had too much money - showing total fund balances as
"surplus". This was a very big issue for the city to overcome 
- even a charter amendment
was placed on the ballot to reduce property taxes because these "concerned citizens" took
this guys word as gold and the city admin as "liars". The good news is the people looked
at the facts, and made the correct decision - to not lower their taxes and keep excellent
long term planning and great city services.
Practitioner 
- Medium City, Ohio
Having the CAFRs easily available does not really cost down on costs. We have saved
producing one or two copies. However, it is valuable to have them available. It has
created as much havoc as good since people read them and do not understand them or the
differences between a CAFR and a budget.
Practitioner - Very Small City, Ohio
Availability at a central location is a great boon to the comunity since we can easily
direct anyone looking for one to the site or send one to their email box. It has certainly
lowered the cost of printing and mailings. It has not helped the average citizen in
becoming more aware of the activities because having the report available on the web has
not done anything to kindle the interest of the average citizen in the comnunity's
financials. Their interest gets peaked when the trash does not get picked up or the
basement floods. It is the same apathy that most citizens display tow ds their state and
the country. Everyone has an opinion but rarely has the time or inclination to get
involved.
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certain population, or apply differently to smaller governments
Academic
Based on SOX, cost will be a significant factor to consider. In aditio what size entity
should be required? Timing of implementation.
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Question 12
(If your city provides a Popular ual Financial Report (PAFR), please comment on its
usefulness in communicating with your citizens. - First two responses)
In addition, please provide any additional comments.
Practitioner - Large City, Florida
The City of XXXXX does not currently produce a PAR report. We issue a CAFR that
has been recognized by GFOA for financial presentation and budget presentation. It is
my intent to issue a PAR type report this year on my Office - the Office of the City
Auditor.
In my view the CAFR needs to be supplemented by a report that identifies Service
Efforts and Accomplishments.
Lastly, the City of XXXXXX has an excellent Audit Committee and I highly recommend
its structure and operation to other local governments.
Practitioner - Medium City, Ohio
I believe the PAFR is the key to the citizen involvement in municipal finance - not the
CAFR. The CAFR would be used as the base, but then user friendly information could
be used from it - such as an annual company report to shareholders as compared with
their 10K filings (compared to the CAFR in gove ent)
Practitioner - Medium City, Ohio
No Comment
Practitioner - Very Small City, Ohio
No comment.
Academic
Good luck with your research project.
Practitioner - Large City, Florida
I think their is a need for a first step in increasing accountability that is less costly: advise
governments to institute an internal audit program. This would not be mandated effort,
and adding such professionals would enhance governance and accountability and if
organized effectively could have significant financial benefits. Once these professionals
are ingrained, create an oversight body such as an independent audit committee. These
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efforts - as at local level - not mandated by the federal or state government would
ncrease controls and effectiveness and not be perceived as a top down approach to
legislate improvements.
GASB Representative
No comment,
Academic
No comment.
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Appendix C - Comments Received on Survey Instrument
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understand it and want to tell gov't how wong we are. The majority of time would be
spent training & retraining them to communicate with our auditor. One more
unnecessary hurdle.
Ohio
The city of X has operated extremely well with none of the above. Too much
regulation and requirements only hamper small towns. We just don't do unnecessary
regulations. So why bother requiring thent
Ohio
We currently have an audit committee, however, since it is comprised of council
members there is no true ability for them to function in the proper role. We are also at
the mercy of the state auditors to determine who will perform our audit.
Florida
Many of our residents who qualify as "audit committee" members do not want to
volunteer do to the litigious nature of public service. They fell even a "perceived"
violation of sunshine laws or any rule or regulation could be harmful to there prof-
personal reputation. We contend with groups of "disgruntled" residents who often
threaten both elected and appointed officials with lawsuits.
Ohio
Independent audit committees in the governmental arena could potentially lead to
political manipulation due to the sometimes sensitive nature of the information that is
received by the committee. We already have too many committees, boards &
commissions.
Ohio
They don't have clue about the financial records & CAFR now. And the certainly
wouldn't have with the implementation of SOX.
Florida
It would be difficult for a medium sized or small city to staff an audit cormrmittee with
qualified members (other than the elected officials serving in that capacity).
Florida
I believe we can comply easily, however i do not see a big benefit with competent staff
who do a good job or are regarded as professional.
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Florida
Overkill - how many municipalities have been accused or convicted of serious
defalcations similar to the Enrons, Worldcoms, etc of the world.
Ohio
Municipalities are different "animals" than the private sector. There is no motivation for
a municipality to "cook the books" or attempt to show a "paper profit". We are already
audited annually, and hold to a very different standard than our counterparts in the private
sector.
Florida
The city has had a citizens finance committee that reviewed the budget, financial advisor
recommendations, and most other financial contracts for independent citizens input.
Can't get volunteers.
Ohio
Under current state law the chief fiscal officer is already covered as the principal officer
ce ification and this be another burden. No problem with the audit committee.
Florida
We may have the most qualified 3 person audit committee in the nation. Excellent,
qualified, committed.
Florida
Can be done given sufficient time and proper attention to the" need"
Ohio
In a small community we would not find individuals willing to serve this capacity.
Ohio
No additional dollars are available for developing, implementing, nor maintaining
additional policies, controls, or procedures.
Ohio
CAFR is too complicated for average citizen
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Ohio
The political implications with respect to "independent" auditors could pose a problem as
those interested in serving on the committee could have political aspirations.
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VITA
DOUGLAS RAY FINK
Born, Dayton, Ohio
1968 S Business Economies
Wright State University
Dayton, Ohio
1972 Masters of Business Administration
Wright State University
Dayton, Ohio
1972 - 1973 Accountant
Ernst & Young, CPAs
Dayton, Ohio
1973 - 1977 Treasurer and Assistant to the President
Rieck Mechanical Services, Inc.
Dayton, Ohio
1976 Certified Public Accountant
State of Ohio
(non-active status)
1978 - 1981 Assistant Professor (Accountancy)
Wright State University
Dayton, Ohio
1978-1981 Leading Partner
Fink, Jeffcott, & Crabtree, CPAs
Centerville, Ohio
1981 - 1987 Township Trustee
Washington Township
Montgomery County, Ohio
1981 - 1987 President
Areripak, Inc.
Middletown, Ohio
1987- 1991 President
Douglas . ,Inc.
Washington Township, Ohio
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